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ABSTRACT
There are high expectations for a global commercial space travel market which is expected to turn into a multi-billion Euro business
in the next two decades. Several key players in the space business, companies like Virgin Galactic, SpaceX, Blue Origin or SNC
are preparing to serve this market by developing their own ballistic reusable space vehicles to carry humans and cargo payloads into
suborbital and Low Earth Orbit (LEO) space. Europe’s single stage to orbit concepts, e.g., REL’s Skylon or Airbus’ Spaceplane, go
even further and target for manned suborbital point-to-point (p2p) transportation, similar to today’s travel through airspace, but with
much shorter flight times. All these developments will likely stimulate demands for new infrastructure (e.g., for spaceports, tracking
& surveillance networks or control centres), requiring the implementation of adequate Space Traffic Management (STM) systems,
proper Safety, Reliability and Operations Concepts and a seamless integration of space vehicles into the daily air traffic flow. Despite
some initial efforts, management of and access to commercial aerospace is lacking a coordinated approach in Europe and compared
to the U.S., Europe is by no means prepared to serve the developing space travel market in the near future. Without a consolidated
European, yet global, commitment to commercial STM, the growing number of space vehicles expected to pass through aerospace
in the coming years is going to jeopardise human health and airspace safety. In this White Paper (Paper I) we summarise key results
from an evaluation study conducted by DLR GfR and partners on behalf of ESA with the objective to generate a roadmap for the
implementation of a European STM system within the next two decades under consideration of an evolving Air Traffic Management
(ATM) system. In order to demonstrate that collision risks do not prevent suborbital space flights right from the start, we provide proof
of concept that this kind of travel is generally feasible, given that significant advances in heat and collision shielding technologies are
made. We discuss the envisioned technical, conceptual and organisational setups in response to Europe’s STM needs, focussing on
technology and infrastructure development, Space Debris, Space Surveillance & Tracking, Space Weather Monitoring and ATM and
STM integration. For the STM system to be operational in the 2030 – 2035 time frame, the initial roadmap is presented together with
the Top 10 list of STM issues that need to be tackled. In Paper II (Tüllmann et al. 2017b), we discuss Safety & Reliability aspects
related to STM and propose a first risk quantification scheme together with initial values for the acceptable levels of safety of the
identified hazards and risks. This mini series of papers is concluded by Paper III (Tüllmann et al. 2017c) in which we provide initial
system requirements, constraints and recommendations that should be considered for a European STM setup.
Key words. Space Traffic Management – Air Traffic Management – suborbital point-to-point space flights – Space Weather Moni-
toring Centre – European Space Surveillance and Tracking Centre – space debris & collision risks – safety & reliability – roadmap
1. Introduction
Recent developments in the U.S. space business sector provide
strong indications that in the next one to two decades commer-
cial Space Traffic Management (STM) could turn into a multi-
billion Euro business and even become a global effort. In this
context, one of the most important commercial drivers for Space
Traffic is considered Space Travel, focussing on manned ballis-
tic suborbital flights (e.g., for space joyriders wishing to expe-
rience zero gravity) and manned suborbital point-to-point (p2p)
space flights through Near-Earth space (e.g., for tourist or busi-
ness travel). Other use cases for commercial Space Traffic would
be suborbital p2p cargo transportation or satellite deployment via
Low Earth Orbit (LEO). However, before we move forward, it is
impertative to elaborate on what we mean when we talk about
STM. Because the standard definition of the term "Space Traf-
fic Management", as for example used by Schrogl et al. (2016),
appears inaccurate for the purpose of this study, we define STM
here as the:
Execution of all necessary Managing and Monitoring &
Control Operations (including routine and contingency
scenarios) to ensure safe ballistic travel of manned and
unmanned Suborbital Space Vehicles (SSVs) and space-
planes through Near-Earth space and airspace under con-
sideration of the existing European Air Traffic Manage-
ment System and Infrastructure.
In this definition, the term “Space Traffic” relates to all manned
and unmanned spacecraft that enter or leave Near-Earth space on
either suborbital or orbital trajectories. By “suborbital” we mean
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either almost vertical ballistic trajectories with nearly the same
start and end point or trajectories with a different start and end
point which can also lead through Low Earth Orbit (LEO) for
a few minutes. When the context is clear, “Space Traffic” and
“Space Travel” are used synonymously.
The expectations of a growing STM market are nourished
by several market evaluation studies that have been conducted
over the years with the scope to analyse the potential of a private
Space Travel market (e.g., NASA & STA 1997; Futron Corp.
2002, 2006; Ziliotto 2010; FAA 2010; FAA & Space Florida
2012; Booz & Company 2013; Le Goff & Moreau 2013; Airbus
2015; Crabtree et al. 2015; IATA 2015). If Europe wants to play
an adequate role in commercial STM and get its equal share of
this lucrative market, Europe should now start the development
of its own STM system and implement it in close collaboration
with international partners and in agreement to global needs.
Because there is no unanimous European approach to STM
and noticeable efforts of the relevant stakeholder to integrate
suborbital spaceplanes into the European Air Traffic Manage-
ment (ATM) are lacking, DLR GfR conducted together with its
partners on behalf of ESA, an evaluation and roadmap study
on the establishment of a European STM system. The follow-
ing five topics represent the main pillars of the study: (i) Space
Surveillance & Tracking, (ii) Space Debris, (iii) Clean Space &
the Environment, (iv) Space Weather and (v) Space Traffic Con-
trol. In order to generate the roadmap, a holistic system approach
is followed, e.g., by analysing whether collision risks would ac-
tually permit commercial Space Travel, performing gap analyses
of the needed infrastructure and services, providing concepts to
close these gaps, deriving initial quantifications of safety risks
in space, airspace and on ground and identifying interfaces to
safely implement STM into a continuously evolving European
ATM, also known as Single European Sky (SES, see the ATM
Master Plan (2015)). In the following we describe the main find-
ings of the study and outline how to achieve a seamless integra-
tion of the STM and ATM systems.
2. Study Objectives
The goal of this study is to provide a description of possible tech-
nical, programmatic and organisational contributions required in
response to Europe’s STM needs and to identify links and inter-
faces to other potential stakeholders worldwide. The following
main study objectives apply:
• Analysis of Air and Space Traffic monitoring capabilities
available to international partners in view of complementary
and collaborative developments, with a focus on very low
orbital domains (altitudes ≤ 1 000 km)
• Provision of first risk quantifications associated with de-
bris impacts and spacecraft collisions on manned suborbital
flights, reflecting aspects of human health, spacecraft shield-
ing and protection
• Provision of first risk quantifications associated with con-
trolled and uncontrolled re-entering debris on air traffic
• Identification of other risks for Air and Space Traffic, e.g.,
from Space Weather or micro-meteoroids
• Identification of current and future monitoring gaps and pos-
sible counter-measures
• Recommendations for technologies required to perform ad-
equate mitigation and remediation measures to ensure safe
traffic through air and space
• Investigation on how a European STM system can be inte-
grated with an evolving ATM
• Generation of a roadmap for implementation, considering
national efforts and interests, as well as European collabo-
rations with international partners.
It is stressed that this study is neither about political or legal
issues related to STM nor market analysis and prediction.
3. Space Traffic Management
In the next 10 to 20 years STM is likely becoming an interna-
tional and worldwide effort, to which Europe should contribute
with an appropriate system. Intercontinental long haul flights
through airspace (e.g., from Europe to the U.S. or to East Asia)
could soon be progressively replaced by equivalent trips through
suborbital space. Contrary to the management of airspace, which
is in each nation’s sovereignty, space around Earth is free and
shall be, according to the Outer Space Treaty from 1967, "the
province of all mankind" (UNOOSA 1966). Therefore, it is not
up to individual nations to authorise passage through the space
volume located above their territory or over the polar and oceanic
regions. All this calls for an international, yet global collabo-
ration. In addition, suborbital space travel within Europe will
most likely never become a profitable business as the overall
gate-to-gate travel time for a suborbital flight would be compa-
rable to that of an ordinary flight through airspace. Therefore,
national solo attempts aiming to establish localised small-scale
STM systems, possibly even with their own national regulations
and rules, would be for neither party’s benefit. Those conflicting
activities would just be significant cost drivers, delay the imple-
mentation of a European STM and the return of investments.
Even more important, with ongoing harmonisation efforts for a
global ATM network between Europe and the U.S. (Nelson et
al. 2015) and with first initiatives from the EU and EASA elab-
orating on how to accommodate suborbital flights in Europe, the
road is already being paved towards a global STM.
The European STM concept presented here is developed
against a baseline, the Reference Operations Scenario (ROS),
which shall reflect a set of typical routine and contingency op-
erations scenarios and relevant safety operations aspects. In the
present case, ROS considers suborbital p2p travel from Space-
port A to Spaceport B (and return to Spaceport A) with space
vessels having a seat capacity of at least 6 passengers and a
cargo capacity of more than 800kg. Those gliders are envisaged
to move on ballistic trajectories at maximum altitudes between
100 km and 500 km. The typical time spent in or near apogee
shall be less than 1 hour, i.e. much less than one orbital period.
In Figure 1, the ROS adopted for this study is presented, de-
picting a typical scenario for intercontinental space travel ex-
pected in 10 to 15 years from now. At Spaceport A, a spaceplane
is waiting for departure for its suborbital flight to Spaceport B.
It is supervised, monitored and guided from ground through
airspace by the Air Traffic Control Operator (ATCO) who is
responsible for the airspace around Spaceport A. Before take-
off, the crew aboard the spaceplane needs to receive the latest
flight information, comprising of updated Space Weather Re-
ports (e.g., warnings about radiation hazards or ionospheric cor-
rections relevant for position determination), flight plan and tra-
jectories (with actual departure time, backup and contingency
trajectories) and flight corridor assignments (with backup and
emergency flight corridors, i.e. safety buffers of blocked airspace
around the spaceplane). All these products need to be automati-
cally generated and disseminated to ATCOs and as well to Space
Traffic Control Operators (STCOs) by dedicated and still to be
established entities, such as the proposed Space Weather Mon-
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Figure 1: Adopted Reference Operations Scenario, reflecting typical routine and contingency operations for suborbital spaceflights
from Spaceport A to Spaceport B with respect to monitoring and control (M&C) operations, handover and handback operations,
communication (blue and orange arrows) and data and service products exchange (green and purple arrows).
itoring Centre (SWMC) and the European Space Surveillance
and Tracking Centre (ESSTraC).
Once all flight data has been received and validated by
the crew on board, the spaceplane is ready for take-off and is
guided by the ATCO to upper airspace, e.g., to Flight Level 650
(FL650), i.e. an altitude of ∼22 km, where a handover from Air
Traffic to Space Traffic Control Operations is performed. From
now on, the STCO is responsible for guiding the spaceplane,
monitoring its trajectory and issuing corrective manoeuvres in
case deviations between predicted and current flight paths in-
crease the risk for civil aviation at re-entry beyond an acceptable
level. STCOs are also in charge to provide assistance in case
of contingencies aboard the vessel which require a detour or to
abort the trip. In those cases, contingency flight plans and trajec-
tories have been calculated with alternative landing sites which
would allow the crew to deviate from its original flight path.
Handback operations from STCO to ATCO are executed
when the spaceplane descends and crosses FL650 again. Be-
cause we are considering an intercontinental space flight, it is
very likely that national borders and international space has been
crossed and ATCOs and STCOs have changed. Therefore, this
kind of interface requires global collaboration and a harmoni-
sation and consistent evolution of airspace design (as e.g., cur-
rently seen between Europe and the USA). After handback it is
up to the ATCO to check whether the accuracy of the re-entry
position agrees with the corresponding risk figures for air traffic
and to issue corrective manoeuvre instructions if indicated.
Finally, the ATCO needs to assist the pilot during landing and
taxiing to the spaceport terminal. From a European ATM per-
spective, all aforementioned aspects and communication flows
included in the ROS are new and are currently not reflected in
the 2015 edition of the SES Master Plan. In other words, Space
Travel, be it an intercontinental p2p trip or a suborbital ballistic
joyride, is apparently not considered a high priority in Europe’s
strategic ATM planning.
Generally, three fundamental technological and organisa-
tional challenges need to be overcome (political or legislative
constraints might be an even larger hurdle, but are not covered
here). These challenges are related to the development and im-
plementation of appropriate:
(i) Technology and Infrastructure (e.g., spaceplanes, space-
ports, Clean Space, Flight Planning & Scheduling (FPS),
ESSTraC, the SWMC, communication networks and data
centres)
(ii) Operations concepts and procedures (e.g., for Space
Weather monitoring, Space Surveillance and Tracking
(SST), FPS, Search & Rescue, Clean Space, spaceports and
ATM & STM integration)
(iii) Products and Services (e.g., Space Weather Bulletins
(SWBs), Total Electron Content (TEC) maps, Collision
Risk Analyses (CRAs), trajectories, flight plans).
In the following, we will elaborate on these gaps and deficien-
cies and provide a possible high-level implementation approach
for a joint European Air and Space Traffic Management which
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may serve as add-on to the SES initiative. In addition, we investi-
gate how to integrate ESA’s Space Situational Awareness (SSA)
monitoring efforts into a holistic European Space Traffic Man-
agement concept and develop a roadmap for its implementation.
3.1. Spaceplane Concepts
Several key players in space business, companies like SpaceX
(Falcon 9 + Dragon), Blue Origin (New Shepard), Virgin Galac-
tic (SpaceShipTwo, LauncherOne), Orbital (Pegasus) or SNC
(Dream Chaser) actively develop and test their own reusable
space vehicles. Except for the SpaceX and Dream Chaser de-
signs, which are developed to deliver satellites into LEO and/or
to transport crew and cargo to/from the International Space Sta-
tion (ISS), the other designs shall carry up to 6 humans or cargo
payloads of up to 1 metric ton into suborbital space (for zero g
experience/experiments). Besides these U.S.-based companies,
there are a couple of European outstanding concepts, such as
DLR’s SpaceLiner (e.g., Sippel 2010; Sippel et al. 2013), Air-
bus’ Spaceplane or the ambitious hypersonic Skylon spaceplane
developed by Reaction Engines Ltd. (REL), a privately owned
British company with BAE Systems as shareholder. Especially
the latter two designs deserve a closer look. Both systems feature
a reusable single-stage-to-orbit approach with horizontal take-
off and landing (HOTOL) capability. By design these two Eu-
ropean concepts are different from the U.S. vertical take-off and
landing (VTOL) concepts and from Virgin Galactic’s hybrid de-
sign in that they behave almost like ordinary aircraft in airspace
and do not depend on a mother ship that lifts them to a given
altitude.
Among all those spaceplane designs, Europe has with Sky-
lon, at least on paper, one of the most promising concepts to
successfully enter the commercial space transportation market.
This is for a couple of reasons:
1) Skylon could, in contrast to the U.S. approaches, si-
multaneously serve two different business cases, namely
deployment/re-supply missions in LEO and suborbital p2p
passenger/cargo transportation.
2) The payload/passenger capacity is with up to 15 metric tons
(or 30 passengers) to a 300 km equatorial orbit much higher
than any of the other spaceplane concepts can achieve.
3) The estimated costs to deliver the payload to LEO shall be,
according to an official statement from the UK Space Agency
from 28 April 2014, “[. . . ] about 1/50th of the cost of tradi-
tional expendable launch vehicles, such as rockets”. To be
more specific, to get Skylon a pound of mass to orbit would
require between US$690 and US$1,230, depending on the
economic forecast scenario (Emspak 2016). This price tag
shall be significantly less than what SpaceX requires for its
Falcon 9 or the upcoming Falcon Heavy.
4) The HOTOL concept and the overall system design promises
to make it much easier to integrate Skylon into existing and
future ATM systems and although the vessel could reach a
hypersonic speed of up to Mach 6 below FL650 (see Wagner
et al. 2015), it would most likely still be certified according
to aviation standards. In addition, no special safety require-
ments, regarding air traffic separation standards are expected
to apply and sophisticated on-board collision avoidance sys-
tems and airspace blocking would also not be needed.
5) Compared to a pure ballistic VTOL flight, Skylon’s aircraft-
like flight performance and low g-forces of ∼2.5g, might pose
an invaluable psychological advantage when it comes to sell-
ing the product on the market, as most people already know
how it feels like flying in an ordinary plane.
Because of these significant advantages, we expect that Skylon,
and HOTOLs in general, will receive much broader acceptance
by the general public from the very beginning, an argument also
corroborated by Ziliotto (2010).
However, Skylon is still in its design phase and according to
BBC News from November 2, 2015, REL anticipates to kick-off
testing of its SABRE engine by 2020, with the first unmanned
test flights to start in 2025. We therefore estimate Skylon to en-
ter routine flight operations in the 2030 time frame. On the other
hand, Blue Origin expects New Shepard to perform first com-
mercial suborbital flights as early as 2018, indicating that com-
mencement of public space travel is already on the verge.
3.2. Spaceports
Spaceports are the analogue to what airports are for aviation
business. They are the sites where manned and unmanned SSVs
are launched and, if we trust the vision of global p2p Space
Travel in a not-too-distant future, spaceports are likely to become
the new vibrant lifelines that connect our world. Spaceports
are also the sites where spaceplanes are maintained and High-
Tech industries can perform research, development and testing
on space applications. However, for the Space Travel market to
develop, certain assets need to be in place, such as a globally
working Space Traffic Management and Control System, space-
ports and a ground infrastructure which efficiently connects them
with major cities and business areas. For reasons of cost effi-
ciency it appears likely that the infrastructure needed for Space
Travel will be geared towards the existing air traffic ground in-
frastructure as this sector has been continuously adapted to cope
with ever growing market demands. Therefore, global suborbital
transportation routes for cargo and passengers are expected to
essentially follow traditional air traffic routes.
As the commercial space travel market matures, currently
isolated spaceports are likely to move closer to more densely
populated areas and business centres and could eventually merge
with existing airports as safety risks related to spaceplane opera-
tions are significantly reduced. Those airports with collocated
commercial spaceports are called aerospaceports. Prime can-
didates which could eventually host aerospaceports in the fu-
ture are London, Frankfurt (for continental Europe), Tokyo, Los
Angeles and New York City. These expectations are corrobo-
rated by work from Witlox et al. (2004), ISU (2008), Carta &
González (2010), GaWC (2012) and Airbus (2015). Based on
the findings of these studies, we identified possible mega cities
and flight routes that we expect to play a key role in commercial
Space Traffic by 2035. In Figure 2 the results for passenger and
cargo flight routes are presented. Large circles represent mega
cities that are or have the potential to become prime aerospace-
ports and hubs, whereas small circles denote mega cities which
are likely to become secondary aerospaceports and hubs due to
their significant growth potential. The bulk of those flight routes
is located in the northern hemisphere and aligned along the axis
North America - Europe - Asia.
Currently, the U.S. put substantial effort into the develop-
ment and construction of commercial spaceports in order to cope
with the anticipated growth of the suborbital space travel market.
Figure 3 shows the current world-wide distribution of spaceports
that have been specifically designed for suborbital space travel.
The map outlines operational spaceports and planned ones with
recent development activities. Other locations, like satellite and
missile launch sites have been omitted. Obviously, 11 of the 20
planned and active spaceports are located on U.S. soil. Among
them are all seven spaceports that are officially operating under
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Figure 2: Potential suborbital Space Traffic routes for passenger (orange) and cargo transportation (red). Large circles represent
mega cities that are or have the potential to become prime aerospaceports/hubs while small circles are for mega cities which are
likely to become secondary aerospaceports/hubs due to their anticipated growth potential. Apparently most of the space traffic routes
are in the northern hemisphere following the axis along North America - Europe - Asia.
Figure 3: Global map of operating and planned Spaceports intending to serve the suborbital Space Travel market (vertical ballistic
and p2p flights).
a U.S. Launch Site Operator License. Although plans for oper-
ating similar spaceports in Europe exist, no European nation is
currently close to issuing similar operator licenses. The same is
true for other nations which reported to plan spaceports, such as
Australia, Malaysia or the United Arab Emirates.
If one compares the expected suborbital Space Traffic routes
depicted in Figure 2 with the map of spaceports presented in Fig-
ure 3, there is a sufficiently good match of destinations between
Europe and the United States of America. However, for conti-
nents like South America and Africa or nations like Russia and
the East Asian region there is a clear deficiency and those ar-
eas appear unconnected to the global network of potential Space
Traffic routes. Although it currently remains unknown what the
concerned nations are planning, it is likely that they wait for the
market to develop and then close the gap by providing the needed
infrastructure.
Similar to the development of space vehicles for space travel
purposes, the U.S. also progressed further regarding the devel-
opment and operations of the necessary infrastructure than the
Europeans or any other nation. In fact, there is even an over-
supply of American spaceports. This is likely the result of local
governments and airport authorities trying to stimulate economic
growth in the area by attracting space industry to do business
at their sites (see e.g., SpaceNews 2016a). The high dynamics
in spaceport development is also globally reflected by the com-
missioning of feasibility studies, e.g., for Glasgow Prestwick
Spaceport (SpaceNews 2016b) and by official announcements
of strategic partnerships between spaceport and spaceplane op-
erators, e.g., between Swiss Space Systems (S3) and Space-
port Malaysia (S3 2013), XCOR and the Caribbean Spaceport
(Kloppenbug 2016) or XCOR and Glasgow Prestwick Spaceport
(Spaceref 2016).1
3.3. Space Traffic Monitoring Programmes
In our view Space Traffic Monitoring represents only a single,
though highly important and safety-critical, aspect any depend-
able STM system has to cope with. Regular suborbital p2p space
1 Note: By the time of writing, XCOR suspended the development of
Lynx (SpaceNews 2016c) and S3 filed for bankruptcy (TheLocal 2016).
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travel has not commenced yet and current monitoring initiatives
are almost entirely restricted to surveying the space environment
(see Schrogl et al. 2016) rather than monitoring Space Traffic
itself. Nevertheless, the implementation of those ongoing mon-
itoring efforts remains a precursor for initial STM service oper-
ations. In the European context ESA’s SSA programme intends
to monitor and track satellites and space debris, to search for
Near-Earth Objects and to monitor and forecast Space Weather
in order to prevent damages to spacecraft, ground infrastructure
and human lives.
In the U.S., the counterparts to SSA are Space Fence (a
programme that was initiated to perform space surveillance of
spacecraft and space debris around Earth) and the Space Weather
Prediction Centre operated by the National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration (NAOO) which is responsible for Space
Weather monitoring and forecasting. While the European space
environment monitoring programme is a civilian project and still
in its infancy, the U.S. military-driven system is already opera-
tional and currently undergoing a full system upgrade. Because
Europe does not have the technical capability yet to detect, track,
generate and to maintain a catalogue of orbital objects, Europe
is completely dependent on U.S. data and their will to share it.
Even for years to come, it is not expected that Europe will reach
the same data quality that the U.S. are likely to achieve soon (i.e.
to detect and track objects at sub-decimetre level).
Besides the lack of a system that monitors and tracks space
debris, there is also a clear deficiency in Europe to monitor and
track the trajectories of commercial spacecraft and except a DLR
study from Drescher et al. (2016) that deals with emergency de-
tection and response organisation for SSVs, no consolidated ef-
fort has been made so far to integrate those vessels with the ex-
isting ATM system. In addition, space debris (re-)entering the
atmosphere or clouds of debris from disintegrating spacecraft
(e.g., as seen during the Columbia accident in 2003) also remain
largely untracked and, despite the existence of the correspond-
ing risks posed to aviation or human safety, are deliberately ac-
cepted.
Considering the anticipated growth potential of the space
travel market, frequent suborbital space rides and p2p travel
seem to be on the verge of becoming reality. In order to cope
with an increasing number of launches (from ground and air) and
re-entries, the closure of large airspace volumes and the redirec-
tion of air traffic flows seems to be a costly and yet impractical
solution. Instead, a dynamical handling of 4D space transition
corridors tailored to the individual spaceplane performance and
providing sufficient safety margins without causing excessive re-
routeing delays and costs for the air traffic sector seems to be
advisable (Bilimoria & Jastrzebski 2013). In the U.S., the merg-
ing of commercial p2p Space Traffic with the Next Generation
Air Transportation System (NextGen) has also progressed much
further than in Europe (see FAA 2001; DOT 2010; FAA 2016)
and although SES, the major re-organisation of the European
ATM, is underway and is even harmonised with the NextGen
ATM concept, the European interface between space and air traf-
fic management has been largely ignored so far. Therefore, sub-
stantial coordinated effort appears necessary if Europe wants to
play a significant role in the area of Space Travel and to get a
good share of this lucrative market.
3.4. Space Debris and Space Surveillance and Tracking
For further discussion and analyses, the following definitions
shall apply. The term ’Space Debris’ is defined as all man-made
objects including fragments and elements thereof in any Earth
orbit, that are non-functional2. The term ’Traceable Object’ re-
lates to an object which is detected and for which an orbit is
determined and propagated. This includes keeping the object in
a database and maintaining it. Traceable objects include space
debris as well as functional satellites. ’Non-traceable Objects’,
however, escape detection and will therefore remain unknown to
a Space Surveillance and Tracking (SST) system. Those objects
are treated via statistical models, such as the ESA Master 2009
model or NASA’s ORDEM 3.0 (see e.g., Krisko et al. 2015).
In order to guarantee safe and secure p2p travel through sub-
orbital and LEO space, the SSVs and spaceplanes need to avoid
any catastrophic collisions during flight with other objects. This
requires detailed knowledge about the trajectories of these ob-
jects as well as the definition and establishment of adequate risk
and safety standards for commercial manned spacecraft opera-
tions. Given the aforementioned deficiencies, we propose the es-
tablishment of the European Space Surveillance and Tracking
Centre (ESSTraC), an entity that is responsible for operating the
SST sensor network, creating and maintaining an orbital cata-
logue of traceable objects, detecting and tracking fragmentations
and re-entry events, performing collision risk assessments of
detectable objects, flight planning and scheduling, contingency
re-planning, safety and security operations and communicating
with ESA, ATCOs/STCOs and with their global counterparts.
Note that layout and concept design of the SST sensor network
is beyond the scope of this paper.
In line with the ROS presented in Figure 1, we envisage ES-
STraC to be primarily responsible for:
• Creating and maintaining an orbital catalogue of traceable
objects
• Detecting and tracking fragmentations and re-entry events
• Performing collision risk assessments of detectable objects
• Creating flight plans, trajectories and flight corridors consis-
tent with collision risk requirements and their corresponding
backup trajectories and contingency plans (e.g., one to seven
days before departure)
• Provide regular updates to the above products (e.g., two
hours before departure)
• Providing collision avoidance warnings and mitigation mea-
sures to ATCOs and STCOs
• Provide latest products to ATCOs and STCOs
• Operate and maintain global sensor networks used for ob-
ject/spaceplane detection and tracking
• Communication with ATCOs and STCOs (routinely and in
contingency situations)
• Perform Special Operations (e.g., provide data on request for
incident investigations, perform conflict-free scheduling and
execution of maintenance downtimes).
Some products provided by the ESSTraC may need some
clarification. Similar to aviation, the term ’Flight Plan’ refers to
a unique identifier of a suborbital p2p flight that is to be sched-
uled and contains, among others, a unique Flight ID-number, the
departure and destination spaceport, a set of corresponding de-
parture and arrival times and some basic technical information
about the spaceplane (e.g., manufacturer, type of vessel (glider
or steerable), seat/cargo capacity, climb rate or minimum turn
radius). The term ’Trajectory’ refers to the pre-determined flight
path of the spaceplane through air and space and is computed
according to specifications given in the flight plan and to colli-
sion risk and space weather risk assessments. In principle, the
2 From: Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UN General Assembly
Resolution 62/217 of 22 December 2007
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collision risk with other spacecraft, space debris or re-entering
objects can be assessed by taking orbital catalogues of traceable
objects and latest tracking information of fragmentations and
re-entry events and by calculating the number of objects along
the flight path for a given p2p connection at a given departure
time (see Sect. 3.4.1). A trajectory would be rejected if an object
would fall below a pre-defined safety distance. In such a case,
new launch windows would have to be found and the trajectory
of the spaceplane would need to be recomputed with different or-
bit parameters, in the most simplistic case by delaying departure
time. In case of short-notice Space Weather alarms, e.g., dur-
ing solar flares (giving reaction times of about 8 min), ESSTraC
would receive a dedicated hazard warning from the SWMC and
perform a reassessment of the risks and a re-calculation of the
safest trajectory to the destination spaceport.
Similarly, ’backup trajectories’ are alternative pre-computed
flight paths based on collision risks and Space Weather warnings
in case in-flight conditions or risks worsen and require a different
orbit. ’Contingency Flight Plans’ are special pre-defined Flight
Plans that are to be executed in case of anomalies or non-nominal
conditions, such as technical failures or security incidents aboard
the vessel, e.g. making it necessary to redirect to an alternative
spaceport. ’Flight corridors’ represent a safety volume assigned
to the space vessel and its 4D trajectory. The size of the safety
volume could be tied to the individual in-flight performance and
manoeuvrability of the vessel as well as to risk assessments for
the type of vessel. In this regard, HOTOL spaceplanes are ex-
pected to have more relaxed flight corridor requirements than
VTOL space vehicles, because of their airplane-like flight per-
formance. Finally, ’Backup Flight Corridors’ and ’Contingency
Flight Corridors’ are the same as flight corridors defined above,
but for backup trajectories and for contingency flight plans, re-
spectively.
However, before we continue to develop more detailed oper-
ations scenarios and concepts, we should demonstrate the gen-
eral feasibility of a suborbital space flight with respect to colli-
sions with space debris by considering a hypothetical flight path
from Sydney (Australia) to Oberpfaffenhofen (Germany).
3.4.1. Demonstrating the Feasibility of Ballistic Space Flights
The feasibility of a hypothetical intercontinental space flight is
analysed regarding collision risks by determining the minimum
distance from the space vehicle’s adopted ballistic trajectory to
all traceable objects in the NORAD Track Two-Line Element
(TLE) database (see http://celestrak.com) as a function of time
and by testing whether the time slot between the two closest en-
counters is sufficiently long to ensure safe passage of the vessel.
For a ballistic flight from Spaceport A to Spaceport B, it is
assumed that the trajectory will be similar to the one outlined
in Figure 4. Here, the angle 2α denotes the shortest angle be-
tween the departure spaceport and arrival spaceport. The maxi-
mum height at apogee is assumed in this example to be 500 km,
which results for an angle of α= 80◦ in a necessary launch veloc-
ity of 7,827 km s−1. As an example for further analysis, a purely
ballistic flight path for the shortest connection between Sydney
(Australia) and Oberpfaffenhofen (Germany) is shown in Fig-
ure 5 with a corresponding angle α= 73, 34◦, not taking Earth’s
rotation during flight into account. In the top panel, altitude as
a function of flight time is shown while in the bottom panel al-
titude versus travelled distance is plotted. When taking Earth’s
rotation into account, the flight times will be different in that the
flight time from Sydney to Oberpfaffenhofen would be shorter
than the flight time from Oberpfaffenhofen to Sydney.
Figure 4: Schematic view of a ballistic flight.
Figure 5: Pure ballistic flight path from Sydney to Oberpfaffen-
hofen for a spherical non-rotating Earth. Panel a): Altitude vs.
time. Panel b): Altitude vs. travelled distance.
For a realistic calculation of the flight path, the space vehicle
must first be accelerated to the required ballistic speed. Assum-
ing a permanent acceleration of 3g, a value that is consistent with
the Skylon approach of 2.5g, the required speed is achieved af-
ter 265s or after a travelled distance of approx. 1033 km. The
corresponding height would be ≈100 km, which is shown by the
green dotted lines in panel b) of Figure 5. The same amount of
time for deceleration is allocated at the end of the flight path.
For comparison, in case of an average rocket launch engine, the
first 120 km in altitude would be achieved before 300 s, a value
which was also valid for the Space Shuttle. At an altitude of
100 km, it is furthermore assumed that the required velocity of
the ballistic flight has been achieved and that the entry point of
the ballistic trajectory is hit with the correct flight vector. For the
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←− AAUSAT-4 is at 36.4 km
min. dist. after t = 1329 s
Figure 6: Distances between space vehicle and TLE-objects for the adopted flight trajectory. TLE-objects are restricted to altitudes
between 100 km and 750 km, respectively, i.e. to altitudes at which TLEs re-enter Earth’s atmosphere or above which the collision
risk caused by TLEs is expected to be negligible.
computation of the ballistic flight path, time, height, and speed
are calculated numerically and interpolated to the desired values
by Chebyshev polynomials, taking into account an ellipsoidal
rotating Earth.
With these assumptions, the flight time from Sydney to
Oberpfaffenhofen results in 2518 s while the flight back would
take 2675 s, including acceleration and deceleration, which is
roughly 42 min and 45 min, respectively. The maximum flight
altitude deviates from 500 km by a few kilometres due to the el-
lipsoidal shape of the Earth. Please note that the stated numbers
are based on approximations of ellipsoidal integrals.
In order to evaluate the possibility that the space vehicle gets
hit by another space object, we analyse how close such objects
can actually get to the spacecraft for an arbitrarily chosen de-
parture time from Sydney Spaceport. For this, the following as-
sumptions apply:
• Departure time is set to 24.08.2016 at 12am (midnight)
• The flight trajectory is the one shown in Figure 5 with a tem-
poral step size of t = 1 s
• Possible objects are taken from the publically available TLE
catalogue as of 24.08.2016 and are called TLE-objects
• The temporal step size of their calculated ephemerides is also
t = 1 s
• The positional accuracy of the TLE-objects is assumed to be
better than 1 km in any direction
• All points where the space vehicle is below an altitude of
100 km are not considered (i.e. re-entering TLE-objects are
expected to pose no threat)
• TLE-objects are filtered and rejected for a perigee height
larger than 750 km, resulting in a total of 4937 TLE-objects.
The distance from the space vehicle to all TLE-objects is
then calculated and stored for each second of the ballistic flight.
For the adopted trajectory, the corresponding distances to the
TLE-objects are plotted in Figure 6. Each distance closer than
500 km in any direction to the space vehicle is shown as a solid
line for each object. In this example, the minimum distance be-
tween the space vehicle and AAUSAT-4 is determined to be
about 36,4 km at flight time t=1594 s (or 1329 s after passing
an altitude of 100 km).
Now, the launch of the space vehicle is delayed by one sec-
ond, yielding different distances to the TLE-objects. Again, the
minimum distance is stored. This is repeated for delay times of
up to 600 s with a step size of one second. The result is pre-
sented in Figure 7 and nicely demonstrates how the closest TLE-
object approaches the space vehicle, reaches its closest distance
and increases its distance thereafter. At some point the away-
moving object is replaced by another approaching TLE-object
which becomes the new closest object to the spacecraft, subse-
quently reaching its minimum distance and increasing it there-
after. In Figure 7 this cycle continues until the maximum launch
delay time is reached.
There is a launch window of almost 3 minutes (see orange
line in Figure 7) where the closest distance to any object during
the whole flight exceeds 50 km. If the allowed safety distance is
relaxed to 30 km, the launch window during which no collisions
are expected increases in this example to more than 6 minutes
(see red line in Figure 7). If the launch accuracy in time and posi-
tion is well below this threshold, the flight could be pre-planned
for this particular flight route and at this particular date so that no
avoidance manoeuvres need to be taken into account. Of course,
this implies that the catalogue used for pre-planning has reason-
able accuracies in position and velocity that are small compared
to the initially adopted miss distance of 30 km.
In order to evaluate whether the above launch windows of
collision-free space, i.e. 2 – 3 slots of ∼120 s duration in a 10 min
time frame, were just a chance coincidence or represent the nom-
inal case, the minimum distances should be calculated for a pe-
riod of one full day. Because such an analysis requires excessive
computation time on a modern multi-core processor system, a
coarser estimation was performed. As a compromise between
computing time and time coverage, a time step size of 120 s for
the launch delay was applied to the calculations that now cover a
time period of 12 hours. At each time step, the minimum distance
between the space vehicle and all TLE-objects for the complete
flight path was calculated and resulted in a first statistical es-
timate on the distribution of closest TLE-objects. The result is
shown in Figure 8.
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Figure 7: Minimum distance between the space vessel and all TLE-objects for the full flight with launch delay times of up to 600s.
0 
Figure 8: Minimum distances between the space vehicle and all TLE-objects in 12 hours (with launch delay times of 2min).
From the histogram it can be seen, that the minimum dis-
tances between the space vehicle and all TLE-objects for a com-
plete flight path are statistically distributed during a period of 12
hours. Considering the results from Figure 7, in that there are
several launch opportunities in a 10 min time frame, it appears
reasonable to expect also multiple launch windows per day for
which a safe and collision-free flight path can be pre-calculated.
It is important to point out, that this analysis relies on approx-
imately 5 000 TLE-objects. Typically, these objects are about 5 –
10 cm in size or larger. If the same analysis is performed with
objects of ≥1 cm, the number of objects which need to be taken
into account would increase by a factor of 5 – 10. There are esti-
mates that a complete catalogue of objects with sizes larger than
1cm could easily comprise a total of 200 000 – 300 000 objects.
For re-entering objects, the ground tracks can be calculated
within a given accuracy. Typically, 15% – 20% of the remain-
ing flight time are assumed (Kinkrad 2013). As a consequence,
the critical time in which a re-entering object might be expected
to cross the flight track of the space vehicle is about 15 min or
shorter. Furthermore, the altitude of the re-entering object is not
well known. As the forces acting on the object vary strongly, the
object might break into several parts at an unknown altitude pro-
ducing a number of objects with unforeseeable aero-dynamical
behaviour. Therefore, it might be cheaper and less risky to wait
for the potential overflight of the object and its debris cloud and
to delay the launch of the space vehicle instead of installing
enough sensors to accurately measure positions and velocities
and to predict the potential flight path of the re-entering objects.
Up to now, there are on average some 80 objects per year for
which it is assumed that some parts might actually reach Earth’s
surface after re-entry.
With the above considerations, we provided proof of concept
that p2p travel through suborbital and LEO space is generally
feasible under certain assumptions. However, we highly recom-
mend to conduct a dedicated follow-up study on possible launch
windows, e.g., by considering more realistic trajectories, time
periods longer than 12 hours or by using different flight destina-
tions and smaller traceable object sizes.
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Figure 9: Spatial densities of non-traceable objects as a function
of altitude (averaged over all declinations δ) for different object
types, with a minimum object size of 1 mm (top), 5 mm (middle)
and 1 cm (bottom).
3.5. Collision Risks from Non-traceable Objects
Collisions with space debris represent a risk that, if not prop-
erly mitigated, will almost certainly be catastrophic for humans
aboard a spaceplane. In Sect. 3.4.1 we have shown that the risk
caused by the traceable object population can most likely be con-
trolled by a thorough monitoring and tracking of those objects.
Figure 10: Spatial density of non-traceable objects as a function
of object size. Densities drop significantly for object sizes larger
than 1 cm.
However, what are the risks for the space vehicle and its pas-
sengers posed by the non-traceable object population? In order
to estimate the risk of an impact, one needs to consider that the
vessel can get hit by particles from any direction. In this regard
the vessel’s cross section, the inclination and latitude of its flight
path, the flight time with respect to flight altitude and the spatial
densities of non-traceable objects need to be analysed. Here the
non-traceable object population with sizes below 1cm is of spe-
cial importance as these particles have the highest spatial density
among all traceable and non-traceable objects and kinetic ener-
gies that are high enough to compromise the structural integrity
of the spacecraft.
In order to assess the collision risk posed by particles of the
non-traceable object population, the object densities provided by
the ESA MASTER 2009 model (Wiedemann et al. 2011) were
analysed. Given the fact that the technical details of the possible
shielding of the space vehicle are currently unknown, densities
for three different minimum particle sizes were taken into ac-
count. Shields for a maximum object size of 1 mm are assumed
to be rather simple, while shielding for 5 mm objects is demand-
ing, but feasible (e.g., the Space Shuttle pressurized cabin had to
withstand an impact of a particle of this size), and shielding for
1 cm particles is deemed extremely demanding. Figure 9 shows
spatial densities of the MASTER population as a function of alti-
tude (averaged over all declinations δ) for minimum object sizes
of 1 mm, 5 mm and 1 cm, respectively.
The MASTER population was truncated at a maximum
size of 10 cm to represent the non-traceable part (including the
traceable part would, however, increase the 1 cm and larger
population by 2.5% only). The altitude was selected to range
from 186 km, the minimum altitude of the MASTER model, to
500 km, the maximum altitude considered for suborbital flights.
In the millimetre-size regime, the population is dominated over
the entire altitude range by solid rocket motor slag (SRMS).
For larger object sizes and altitudes above 450 km, explo-
sion (EXPL) and collision fragments (COLL) become dominant.
Note that the mean density drops by a factor of 17 between 1mm
and 5mm, and a factor of 4.8 between 5 mm and 1 cm. This
exponential increase of the number of objects with decreasing
size and the dominance of the SRMS in the millimetre regime
is clearly visible in Figure 10, where the spatial density of non-
traceable objects as a function of object size is shown.
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Figure 11: Spatial densities of non-traceable objects as a function
of declination (averaged over all altitudes) for different object
types, with a minimum object size of 1 mm (top), 5 mm (middle)
and 1 cm (bottom).
Spatial densities as a function of declination (averaged over
all altitudes) for the three different minimum object sizes are
given in Figure 11. The object densities are not significantly
depending on declination. However, at high latitudes the pop-
ulation is dominated by larger collision and breakup fragments
(peak between 70◦and 75◦), while the maximum around 25◦ is
given by smaller SRMS particles.
Figure 12: Spatial densities of non-traceable objects as a func-
tion of altitude and declination (total of all object types) for a
minimum object size of 1 mm (top), 5 mm (middle) and 1 cm
(bottom).
In Figure 12 the spatial densities of non-traceable objects (to-
tal of all object types) are presented as a function of altitude and
declination for the three minimum object sizes. Note that the
densities may vary by an order of magnitude for a given altitude
depending on the declination δ and vice versa.
In order to estimate the number of impacts experienced by
the space vehicle per unit cross section a and unit travel distance
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Figure 13: Number of impacts for objects >1 mm for an average
cross-sectional area of 1 m2 and a travel distance of 1km as a
function of altitude and declination.
l in a particular region of space, we assume that the vehicle is
traveling with a velocity vsv in an environment where the par-
ticles have velocities vp. While the space vehicle is crossing the
unit volume element dV , the total number of particles in this vol-
ume element will be (1 + vp/vsv) times the unit spatial density ρ.
The average number of impacts can then be calculated as:
n =
a · l
dV
(1 + vp/vsv) ρ dV. (1)
The factor (1 + vp/vsv) is of the order of 2, as we may assume
the space vehicle velocity being of the same order as the average
velocity of the particles (7,8 km s−1 for the ballistic examples in
Sect. 3.4.1, which is of the order of the circular orbit velocity
in LEO). The number of impacts for an average cross-sectional
area of 1 m2 and a travel distance of 1 km was computed for the
worst case of a minimum particle size of 1 mm. The number of
impacts as a function of altitude and declination δ is given in
Figure 13.
In regions with the highest density the number of collisions
is of the order of 3 × 10−10 km−1m−2. For the supposed flight
example from Sydney to Oberpfaffenhofen (cf. Sect. 3.4), the
total path above an altitude of 200 km is roughly 13 000 km. As-
suming that the path would entirely lie in the highest density
region we would expect 3.9 × 10−6 impacts per square metre
from objects larger than 1 mm. Using the average collision rate
of 8× 10−12 km−1m−2, we end up with 1× 10−7 collisions for the
entire journey.
In Table 1 global average spatial densities and impact rates
for the non-traceable object population of three different min-
imum object sizes are summarized. These values are valid for
altitudes between 186 km and 500 km and for declinations in the
range of 0◦ ≤ δ≤ 90◦. The last row lists the number of impacts
per square metre cross section for the hypothetical long distance
flight.
Based on these numbers, we proceed to derive first esti-
mates on space vehicle shielding capabilities and acceptable
flight risks. We assume that collisions, i.e. hyper velocity im-
pacts with object sizes < xmm, with x = (1, . . . , 10) are lethal
for an unshielded SSV. We further assume that the main collision
flux stems from small-size objects (cf. Figure 10). Shielding is
required if the risk arising from objects > xmm is not accept-
able. If no shielding is required, then no CRA for any object is
required and no requirements concerning traceable objects are
needed. If shielding is required, we assume that the risk arising
Table 1: Global average spatial densities and impact rates for
the non-traceable object population and different minimum
object sizes restricted to 186 km≤ altitude≤ 500 km and
0◦ ≤ δ≤ 90◦.
Particle size >1mm >5mm >10mm
Spatial Density 4.1 × 10−6 4.1 × 10−6 4.1 × 10−6
(km−3)
Impact rate 8.2 × 10−12 4.8 × 10−13 1.0 × 10−13
(km−1 m−2)
Impacts/15 000 km 1.2 × 10−7 7.2 × 10−9 1.5 × 10−9
(m−2 15 000 km−1)
from objects > ymm (y > x) is acceptable. Hence, two cases
apply:
• Case A: Shielding of objects < ymm is feasible, then no
CRA for any object is required and no requirements con-
cerning traceable objects are needed.
• Case B: Shielding of objects < ymm is not feasible
– Shielding for objects with < zmm (x < z < y)
– Objects with sizes between z and y need to be tracked
and CRAs are needed.
As an example: If a risk for lethal collision of 1.5 × 10−7
for a SSV or a spaceplane with a 100 m2 cross section is accept-
able, then shielding for objects <10 mm is required. If shielding
is technical and economically feasible, then no CRAs for any
objects are required and no requirements concerning traceable
objects are needed.
The impact rate for suborbital flights primarily depends on
the minimum particle size to be taken into account. Conversely,
the risk associated with the non-traceable population strongly
depends on the maximum particle size for which the space ve-
hicle can be shielded. The essential population to be taken into
account is the SRMS particle population which dominates in the
size range from 1 – 5 mm. Because this population does not show
very significant variation with altitude or declination, a global
average density can be assumed as a rough order of magnitude
assessment of the collision risk. Given the approximations used
in the previous sections and the uncertainties of the population
model, the values provided in Table 1 should be considered as
rough order of magnitude figures.
It is important to point out that even a small impact on an
SSV or a spaceplane, which would not be harmful during the
flight phase in space, may actually cause a catastrophic event
during atmospheric re-entry. Classical shielding technologies
used, e.g., for the ISS are not applicable because of the com-
pletely different environment during re-entry. The wing nose
heat shield of the space shuttle was able to withstand impacts
of objects of about 1 mm in size. On the other hand, it is not
feasible to extend the catalogues of traceable objects to objects
smaller than about 2.5 – 3 cm in the foreseeable future. For risk
mitigation purposes, however, precise and continuous tracking of
several hundred thousand objects and their corresponding orbits
(which are 1 – 2 orders of magnitude more accurate than the ones
in today’s catalogues) appear inevitable. Therefore, the necessity
to have an independent SST network, similar to the currently
upgraded Space Fence system in the U.S. (SpaceNews 2016d),
would by itself justify the establishment of the ESSTraC.
Even more important, there will clearly be a gap between the
current shielding capabilities of about 1 mm and the minimum
traceable object size of about 3 cm in future orbit catalogues. The
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statistical risks for a catastrophic event posed by this gap is of the
order of 1×10−3 per flight, assuming an SSV cross-sectional area
of 100 m2 and that the risk of colliding with an object is 1 out
of 100 potentially catastrophic scenarios. For a spaceplane like
Skylon, the corresponding risk would even increase to ∼8× 10−3
per flight, if we estimate its cross section to about 700 m2.
These risks appear unacceptably high (see also Paper II, Tüll-
mann et al. 2017b, for further details) and bear the danger to ac-
tually prevent p2p space travel in the future. Therefore, the gap
needs to be reduced, primarily by developing new heat and col-
lision shield concepts and technologies which could withstand
impacts from objects larger than 1 mm. Here it is most important
to close the gap in the lower size range, as the smallest objects
pose the highest risk (cf. Figure 10). It is important to note, that
the above figures come from an initial assessment of the gen-
eral feasibility and require further validation before more solid
conclusions can be drawn.
The future evolution of the space object population is hard
to predict. It critically depends on the so-called “traffic model”
(launch rates, mega-constellations, etc.). Moreover, the future
use of solid rocket motors, the main contributors to the critical
population, is even harder to predict. Current evolution models
(using a traffic model based on historic data) predict a statisti-
cal increase of the population of objects larger than 10 cm of
a factor of 2 to 3 over the coming 100 years. However, a few
single collision or fragmentation events may change this picture
drastically (e.g. increasing the population by a factor of 2 in a
few years). If we assume, that the millimetre-size population is
growing proportionally to the number of objects > 10 cm, the im-
pact risk would increase proportionally. Therefore, a continuous
monitoring of the space debris environment, in particular in the
millimetre to centimetre-size range, appears mandatory to assess
and manage the risks posed by collisions with space objects.
It is stressed that the detailed analysis of the shielding capa-
bility for the space vessels, the determination of acceptable risks
and the cost-risk trade-off are beyond the scope of this study and
should be subject to dedicated follow-up studies.
3.6. Space Weather Monitoring
The term ‘Space Weather’ refers to the environmental condi-
tions in interplanetary space and their impact on Earth’s mag-
netosphere, ionosphere and thermosphere as a consequence of
interactions with the Sun, its solar wind and Cosmic Rays. These
conditions can influence the operation and availability of space-
borne and ground-based systems. The natural hazards of Space
Weather do not only modify atmospheric conditions, they also
have the potential to catastrophically disrupt the functionality of
key technologies, e.g., in the areas of communication, naviga-
tion, aviation, transportation, satellite operations, human space
flight or electric power grid operations. Services based on those
technologies are widely used and their interruption can have
strong impacts on everyday life and result in significant econom-
ical losses. For example, mild Space Weather storms can degrade
electric power quality, perturb precision navigation systems, in-
terrupt satellite functions and are hazardous to astronauts’ health.
In the past, severe space storms caused perturbations in the elec-
tric power system and led to the loss of satellites through dam-
aged electronics or increased orbital drag. For rare extreme so-
lar events the effects could be catastrophic with severe conse-
quences for millions of people.
3.6.1. Space Weather Conditions and their Impact on STM
Nominal Space Weather is mostly driven by the Sun and affects
Earth through a variety of different physical processes and on
different time scales. The ionosphere of the Earth is a highly
dynamic layer of the atmosphere that is continuously exposed
to extreme ultraviolet (EUV) radiation emitted by the Sun. The
EUV radiation strength is related to active regions of the sun,
i.e. to places where the Sun’s magnetic field is disturbed. These
regions emit high-energy particles and often produce different
types of solar activity, such as solar flares or coronal mass ejec-
tions (CMEs). Sunspots are visual tracers of such active regions.
If a group of sunspots produces an increase in the EUV flux,
this group will rotate with the Sun in a period of about 27 days,
leading to a 27-day variability of Earth’s ionosphere. In addi-
tion, the 11-year solar cycle with its extremely varying activity
maxima and minima needs to be considered, because, depending
on which phase of the solar cycle is considered, the Ionosphere
would be more or less strongly perturbed.
Moreover, Earth’s rotation leads to a strong ionization of the
ionosphere at the day side, whereas at the night side recombi-
nation considerably reduces the level of ionization. However,
this strong gradient between day and night side leads to addi-
tional transport of plasma in the ionosphere and can cause further
disturbance. Due to the inclination of the Sun, there is an addi-
tional seasonal effect of the ionosphere which leads to different
conditions between summer, winter and equinox. Under nomi-
nal conditions, the ionosphere shows significant regional differ-
ences. Typically the ionosphere is very strong over the equator
and continuously disturbed over the polar regions due to a con-
tinuous stream of charged particles following the magnetic field.
What are the consequences of nominal Space Weather for
suborbital space flights?
• The flight route of every space vehicle has to be checked with
respect to regions of enhanced ionization which might cause
navigation or communication issues
• Likewise, the season and region on Earth, as well as daytime
has to be investigated with respect to the expected pertur-
bations (e.g., in the African region scintillation events take
place very often during equinox at dusk)
• The basic ionization level in the ionosphere is different dur-
ing the solar cycle and to compensate for those variations, it
needs to be checked where we currently are in the cycle
• Also the propagation times of plasma patches and gradients
have to be analysed to know when the navigation augmenta-
tion systems might face performance degradations.
Extreme Space Weather events can occur on different time
scales next to the nominal Space Weather influences and are trig-
gered by the continuous particle stream from the solar wind and
the permanent flow of cosmic particles. These events can have
severe impacts on Space Traffic operations and can lead to the
complete interruption of critical services.
In Table 2, we present a risk register of the most critical risks
and impacts that could occur if Space Weather conditions re-
main unknown to crew and passengers aboard a spacecraft oper-
ating in suborbital space or LEO3. In this regard, the potentially
biggest threats stem from solar flares and high-energy particles
as their time of arrival is relatively short (some 8 – 30 min) mak-
ing it improbable to issue timely re-routeing requests for space-
planes already en route to their destination spaceport.
3 In Paper II (Tüllmann et al. 2017b) the risks identified in Table 2
have been quantified and incorporated into a risk classification scheme
that is proposed as a starting point for discussions and for development
into the final standard.
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Table 2: Risk register related to the risks in case crew and passengers aboard the spaceplane are unaware of Space Weather events
Risk Solar Flares High-Energy Particles Coronal Mass Ejection
Origin Sun Sun / Cosmic Rays Sun
Event Electromagnetic radiation from X-
ray to radio wavelengths
High-energy particles & proton
showers
Energetic particles in the solar
wind
Duration 1 – 2 hrs Solar event: Up to several days Up to several days
Cosmic Rays: Continuous
Time until
arrival
∼ 8 min 15 min – 60 min 1 – 3 days (depending on solar
wind speed)
Causes • Enhanced ionization at the bot- Radiation • Solar storm (extreme solar wind)
tom of the Ionosphere (D-Layer) • Thermosphere heating
• Heating of the Thermosphere • Geomagnetic storms
• Particle precipitation
• Ionospheric disturbances
Impact • Navigation (Positioning, Loss of • Radiation damage (Passengers, • Power outages
Lock) Space & Air Crew) • Internal/External charging
• Radio Blackouts (GNSS Signal • SEU, Latchup • Drag effects, Navigation (Posi-
disturbance) • Interference tioning), High frequency com-
• Drag effects • Degradation (damage of solar munication, geomagnetic in-
cells, microelectronics, etc.) duced currents
Forecast No Yes Yes
Nowcast Yes Yes Yes
Solar Flares occur as a consequence of reconnection pro-
cesses of the solar magnetic field and can generate 1 – 2 hours
of continuous X-ray and EUV emission. This electromagnetic
radiation can reach the Earth within ∼8 min and cause, in case of
strong X-class flares, disturbances of communication and navi-
gation systems. CMEs are plasma clouds of charged particles ex-
pelled from the Sun’s surface that propagate with the solar wind
at an enhanced velocity of up to 2 000 km s−1 (aka. solar storm).
A solar storm interacts with the atmosphere of the Earth after
1 – 3 days and can, depending on the strength and orientation
of the interplanetary magnetic field, cause serious disturbances
and damages of technical infrastructure in space and on Earth.
Solar storms influence also the ionized and neutral atmosphere,
causing significant disturbances in the signal propagation of nav-
igation and communication services.
Solar eruptions occur sporadic and are not predictable. They
release Solar Energetic Particles (SEPs) which can reach the
Earth within 15 – 60 min and can last up to several days. SEPs
interact with the atmosphere and cause ground level enhance-
ments (GLEs), a significant increase of the radiation level on
Earth’s surface. The frequency of all aforementioned events de-
pends strongly on the solar activity, which follows the 11-year
magnetic pole reversal cycle of the sun.
What are the consequences of extreme Space Weather for
suborbital space flights?
• Solar Flares cannot be predicted due to the short arrival time
scale of the X-ray and EUV radiation (∼8 min). Hence, the
timely re-calculation of new trajectories for spaceplanes is
unrealistic and the expected positional inaccuracies have to
be accepted. Real-time monitoring of the ionospheric effects
with adequate descriptions of the influences on communica-
tion and navigation as well as error correction is possible.
• The impact of CMEs on the Ionosphere can be predicted
with 2 – 3 hours lead time for mid-latitudes based on solar
wind measurements of the DSCOVR satellite at L1 posi-
tion. Earlier information on CMEs are very inaccurate re-
garding global arrival times and impact probabilities, but can
be derived from observations with the SOHO, GOES and
STEREO spacecraft.
• The prediction time scale for SEPs is with 15 – 60 min very
limited. However, such events can last for several days and
can produce enhanced radiation at flight altitudes affecting
both air and space traffic. In case of a severe SEP event, flight
routes and altitudes need to be changed and space operations
need to be cancelled or postponed.
The frequency of the above discussed Space Weather events de-
pend on the solar activity, which follows the solar cycle. The
probability for extreme Space Weather events causing strong im-
pacts on flight operations, infrastructure and temporal restric-
tions to not endanger human lives is estimated to be one event
per solar cycle.
3.6.2. A European Space Weather Monitoring Centre
In order to mitigate the negative effects of Space Weather, an in-
ternational monitoring network jointly operated by Europe, the
U.S., and other space-faring nations appears mandatory. Cur-
rently, the main activity with respect to the establishment of
Space Weather services in Europe is related to the implemen-
tation of independent monitoring capabilities as part of ESA’s
Space Situational Awareness (SSA) Programme4. However, de-
spite many European initiatives to raise Space Weather aware-
ness and to enter an initial service provision phase (e.g., originat-
ing from the FP7 programme, Horizon 2020, the working groups
of the Space Weather Working Team or the Joint Research Cen-
tre of the European Commission), there is still no end-to-end
Space Weather monitoring, forecasting and reporting for STM
purposes as envisaged in the ROS outlined in Figure 1.
Therefore, initial ideas for a Space Weather monitoring con-
cept are presented that is tailored to the needs of a European
STM system and identifies the still missing infrastructure, inter-
4 See http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Operations/Space_Situational
_Awareness/SSA_Programme_overview
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Table 3: Needed infrastructure for a SWMC supporting a European Space Traffic Management system
Needed Infrastructure Explanation Products & ESA customer requirements
TEC processing system System for processing GNSS data streams,
deriving estimates of the Total Electron Con-
tent (TEC), producing TEC maps and its
derivatives. Needs NTRIP data input from
global reference networks like the Interna-
tional GNSS Service (IGS).
TEC Map,
TEC RATE MAP
Scintillation processing system System for processing high-rate GNSS data
and deriving scintillation indices
ROTI (Rate of Change of TEC index),
S4, σϕ (sigma phi)
Sun information from GOES and the comple-
mentary Global Ionospheric Flare Detection
System (GIFDS)
GIFDS: Global measurement system based
on VLF measurement to monitor and evalu-
ate solar flares in Real-time.
SEP event monitoring can be done using
GOES
Real-time Flare information for Warning
Messages
ESA requirements:
SWE-CRD-SCO-1548,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1549,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1558
Multilevel Warning System for GNSS Users 1. Early Warning
2. L1-Warning
3. Forecast
4. Ionospheric Alert
Early Warning Messages for GNSS users de-
rived from solar observations.
Dissemination of short and long term pre-
diction and real-time evaluation of the iono-
spheric state for GNSS users
High Rate GNSS Receiver Network A near real-time facility capable of acquiring,
processing and distributing high rate GNSS
data and GNSS-related data products
Delivery of the scintillation indices S4 and
σϕ
Ionospheric Forecast System Needed to forecast ionospheric disturbances
around the world, including direct informa-
tion from approaching Space Weather events.
Delivery of TEC maps over Europe up to 24
hours in advance taking possible ionospheric
perturbations from geomagnetic storms into
account.
Real-time TEC Time Series Plotter Functional user interface to extract time se-
ries data from global TEC maps
ESA requirements:
SWE-CRD-SCO-1548,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1566
LEO satellite measurements Radio occultation and topside measurement
to increase monitoring and forecast of the
ionosphere over oceans and mountain regions
ESA requirement:
SWE-CRD-SCO-1565
Neutron Monitor Network Ground based radiation measurements to
identify GLEs
ESA requirement:
SWE-CRD-SCO-1559
Magnetometer Network Real-time measurements of Geomagnetic
Storm Conditions.
ESA requirements:
SWE-CRD-SCO-2650,
SWE-CRD-SCO-2650
faces and service products5. Because a central European entity
in response to the needed services is missing, we propose the
establishment of a European Space Weather Monitoring Centre
(SWMC) that shall be responsible for:
• Performing 24/7 Space Weather monitoring
• Providing Space Weather information 24/7 via dedicated
web pages (passive information flow)
• Providing products needed for FPS operations via direct data
streams to ATCOs and STCOs (active information flow)
• Issuing of daily and ad hoc SWBs
• Operating and maintaining an active warning system by pro-
viding email alerts and xml notifications to STCOs and AT-
COs on Space Weather events having a potentially high risk
to affect safe spaceplane operations
• Providing technical and scientific support 24/7 for services
and products
• Maintenance of communication networks and web pages
• Supporting the International Civil Aviation Organisation
(ICAO) on relevant Standards and Recommended Practices
(SARP)
5 Initial high-level technical requirements and interfaces for a Euro-
pean contribution to Space Traffic Management are listed in Paper III
(Tüllmann et al. 2017c) and may also serve as starting point for deriv-
ing the final set of technical STM requirements.
• Supporting the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO)
on defining and improving observation and service require-
ments to protect against Space Weather hazards
• Performing Special Operations (e.g., provide data on request
for incident investigations, performing conflict-free schedul-
ing and execution of maintenance downtimes).
In addition, the SWMC could be responsible for routinely
providing the following data products and services:
• Generating and disseminating near real-time global TEC
maps as well as high-resolution regional maps (e.g., close
to spaceports)
• Producing and circulating at least one hour forecasts of the
global TEC and regional TEC (e.g., close to spaceports)
• Generating records of scintillations (small-scale high-
frequency interference)
• Providing scintillation indices and near real-time scintilla-
tion monitoring based on high rate GNSS measurements
• Producing and disseminating global Change Rate Of TEC
index (ROTI) maps
• Providing equivalent slab thickness for spaceport locations
• Providing information on actual and forecasted geomagnetic
indices.
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Table 4: Existing and needed products to secure reliable Space Weather monitoring
Product-ID Product name Unit Comments Existing / needed
service
Additional information
P-STM-1 TEC map TECu TEC is used for Range-Error
corrections (e.g. WAAS or
EGNOS)
Existing
(I-ESC)
ESA requirement:
SWE-CRD-SCO-1539
EU, global
P-STM-2 TEC error map TECu Can be used to estimate the for-
mal error of map generation and
therefore the accuracy of range
error estimation in applications
Existing
(I-ESC)
ESA requirement:
SWE-CRD-SCO-1539
EU, global
P-STM-3 TEC rate TECu s−1 Dynamics indicator. The TEC-
rate is subject to horizontal gra-
dients and to fast phase changes
during solar flares, causing
problems for satellite tracking
Existing
(DLR)
ESA requirement:
SWE-CRD-SCO-1539
EU, global
P-STM-4 TEC gradients TECu km−1 Can be used to rate the horizon-
tal TEC gradients, influences
the solution for phase ambigui-
ties in GNSS reference systems
Existing
(DLR)
ESA requirement:
SWE-CRD-SCO-1539
EU, global
P-STM-5 TEC map
(1h forecast)
TECu Short term prediction Existing
(I-ESC)
ESA requirement
SWE-CRD-SCO-1539
EU, global
P-STM-6 TEC map
(Quality of the
prediction)
TECu
%
To validate the quality and reli-
ability of the short term predic-
tion
Existing
(I-ESC)
ESA requirement:
SWE-CRD-SCO-1539
EU, global
P-STM-7 TEC map
24h forecast
TECu Rough medium term prediction Existing / Needed
(DLR)
ESA requirements:
SWE-CRD-SCO-1539,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1585,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1586
EU
Empirical model estimat-
ing ionospheric storm
impact, using statistics
of past storms. Global
model is needed.
P-STM-8 TEC map 24h
(Quality of the
prediction)
TECu
%
To validate the quality and re-
liability of the rough medium
term prediction
Existing / Needed
(DLR)
ESA requirements:
SWE-CRD-SCO-1539,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1585,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1586
EU, global is needed
P-STM-9 TEC map 24h –
48h forecast
TECu Long term prediction, data-
triggered physical model
Needed
ESA requirements:
SWE-CRD-SCO-1539,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1585,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1586
EU, global
P-STM-10 TEC map 24h –
48h
(Quality of the
prediction)
TECu
%
To validate the quality and reli-
ability of the long term predic-
tion
Needed
ESA requirements:
SWE-CRD-SCO-1539,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1585,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1586
EU, global
P-STM-11 Disturbance
Ionosphere
Index (DIX)
Characterises the level of dis-
turbance in the ionosphere and
therefore the possible perfor-
mance of precise GNSS in ref-
erence networks
Needed (under devel-
opment at DLR)
ESA requirements:
SWE-CRD-SCO-1539,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1589
EU, global
P-STM-12 Geoplasma
reconstruction
e−m−3 Vertical TEC information for
modelling. Use for 3D Assim-
ilation
Existing
(DLR)
ESA requirements:
SWE-CRD-SCO-1539,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1562
EU, global
P-STM-13 3D reconstruc-
tion
e−m−3 Comprehensive representation
of radio wave propagation ef-
fects possible, high level iono-
spheric information as long as
the temporal and spatial resolu-
tion fulfil user requirements
Existing
(DLR)
ESA requirements:
SWE-CRD-SCO-1539,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1561
Global
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Table 4: Continued
Product-ID Product name Unit Comments Existing / needed
service
Additional information
P-STM-14 Scintillation
measurements
S4 and σϕ Characterises small-scale per-
turbations in the ionosphere
which have degrading influ-
ences on all GNSS signals and
can lead to the complete loss of
signal
Existing
(I-ESC)
ESA requirements:
SWE-CRD-SCO-1539,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1563
Local
P-STM-15 ROTI TECu min−1 Global ROTI maps can be used
to detect small and medium
scale ionospheric irregularities
Existing
(I-ESC)
ESA requirements:
SWE-CRD-SCO-1539,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1563
Global
P-STM-16 Weekly or Daily
Space Weather
Bulletin (SWB)
Info Information on expected Space
Weather conditions
Needed
ESA requirement:
SWE-CRD-SCO-1583
EU, global
P-STM-17 Space Weather
incident reports
Info Information on ad hoc Space
Weather effects from solar
flares, CMEs and high-energy
proton events.
Existing / Needed
(R-ESC, S-ESC)
ESA requirements:
SWE-CRD-SCO-1531,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1533,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1577
Arrival time of flares
(∼8 min) and high-
energy proton events
(∼15 min). No forecast
possible.
P-STM-18 Early Warning Info Information on Space Weather
events at the Sun and impact es-
timation
Existing / Needed
(I-ESC, S-ESC)
ESA requirements:
SWE-CRD-SCO-1532,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1546,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1566,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1584
Further development to
improve spatial and tem-
poral accuracy needed.
P-STM-19 L1-Warning Info Information on arriving CMEs
and their expected impact
Needed (under devel-
opment at DLR)
ESA requirements:
SWE-CRD-SCO-1532,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1566,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1584,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1589
EU, global
P-STM-20 Ionosphere
Warning Scale
tbd. Information on Space Weather
effects on the ionosphere in
analogy to the NOAA-SWPC
Space Weather Warning Scales
Needed
ESA requirement:
SWE-CRD-SCO-1546,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1584,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1589
EU
P-STM-21 Radiation Info Human spaceflight – Increased
crew radiation exposure risk
(SWE-SRD-12560)
Existing
(R-ESC)
ESA requirements:
SWE-CRD-SCO-1533,
SWE-CRD-SCO-1567
Global, local
P-STM-22 Geomagnetic
storm condi-
tions & index
Info Required to determine risk of
internal charging leading to dis-
charge
Existing
(G-ESC,WDC)
ESA requirement:
SWE-CRD-SCO-1564
Global, local
Due to the complex and far-reaching nature of Space
Weather events, global coverage from ground-based and space-
borne observation systems is essential for providing reliable
Space Weather services and products. A gap analysis has
been performed to identify the needed infrastructure for Space
Weather monitoring services. The results of this analysis are
summarised in Table 3 where a compilation of systems is given
that are essential to ensure reliable and secure STM operations
and a reference to the applicable segment-level ESA programme
requirements for Space Weather is made (see ESA 2011).
A gap analysis has also been performed on existing and
needed Space Weather services. Table 4 provides an overview
about existing and needed Space Weather products tailored to
Space Traffic Management operations. The entities which al-
ready provide these products are listed in col. 5 along with the
applicable segment-level ESA requirements for Space Weather
(see ESA 2011).
Radiation will be a big issue for all manned Space Traffic
operations and has to be seriously taken into account. First oper-
ational models for space radiation assessment exist (e.g., Posner
et al. 2010; Matthiä et al. 2014, 2015; Schrijver et al. 2015), but
further development, elaboration and application of improved
models is needed. In Europe, there is still a lack of space mon-
itoring of reliable, on-line proton data in the MeV range. These
data together with on-ground monitors are needed for the devel-
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Figure 14: Information flow between SWMC, ATCOs and
STCOs.
opment of reliable radiation transport models to assess radiation
exposure for aircraft/spacecraft crews, astronauts and avionics.
3.6.3. SWMC Interfaces with ATCOs and STCOs
The interaction between the SWMC, ATCOs and STCOs is en-
visaged to be based on a passive and active information flow
as outlined in Figure 14. The passive information flow shall be
available 24/7 through a dedicated web page, where ATCOs and
STCOs can find all information needed for secure space flight
operations under nominal and weak Space Weather conditions.
In case of strong and extreme Space Weather events, a Space
Weather incident protocol needs to be implemented, actively
distributing information via Email on Space Weather hazards.
The SWMC shall also be able to provide technical and scien-
tific support on a 24/7 basis. The SWMC shall only inform the
ATCO and the STCO about Space Weather hazards and not di-
rectly communicate with the SSV pilots in order to not distort
the proper information flow. The ATCO and STCO would then
have to inform the crew aboard the spaceplane about appropriate
measures of existing Space Weather hazards.
Based on the infrastructure listed in Table 3, the SWMC shall
be capable to continuously inform about Space Weather condi-
tions via dedicated web services providing at a minimum the
products listed in Table 4. These products shall help to lower the
risks and impacts listed in Table 2 from an unacceptably high
safety risk level to an acceptable one (see Tüllmann et al. 2017
(Paper II) for a discussion of the proposed Safety Risk Classifi-
cation Scheme). All products shall be accessible for STCOs and
ATCOs so that they can download the relevant data files and use
them for internal evaluation and further dissemination. In case of
critical, permanently needed products, e.g., for flight scheduling
and flight operations above FL650, a direct and continuous data
stream to the ATCOs and STCOs could be established. Further-
more, a weekly Space Weather Bulletin (SWB, P-STM-16) shall
be implemented which informs about the actual and predicted
Space Weather conditions (e.g., for flight planning purposes).
The SWB should be monitored and generated by the SWMC
operator electronically, focussing on products and informa-
tion needed at ATCO/STCO-level. The Operator can also re-
act on specific Space Weather incidents or irregularities by
adding products or further explanations to the product. Operator-
commented plots would give additional information on the
broader context. The SWB should be compiled at least every
week and contain data from 8 days (with one day overlap). De-
pending on ATCOs/STCOs needs, it shall also be possible to
generate daily, hourly and on-demand SWBs, presenting the ac-
tual information and forecast together with all information from
the previous day. The SWMC operator needs to monitor and
analyse the solar interaction chain from Sun to Earth. In order to
be more precise, the following non-conclusive list contains the
different Space Weather conditions which have to be checked
prior to generating a SWB:
• The interplanetary and geomagnetic conditions: Time series
of the F10.7 index, the interplanetary magnetic field con-
ditions from ACE/ DSCOVR, the solar wind velocity from
ACE/ DSCOVR, the dynamic pressure as well as the geo-
magnetic indices Kp and Dst
• The Sun’s activity: Flares, CMEs and high-energy solar
particle events need to be monitored and analysed using
satellite-based solar observations
• The radiation environment: The actual and expected radia-
tion levels from Cosmic Rays (solar and galactic)
• The ionospheric weather conditions: TEC latitude time plots,
global TEC maps can be presented in a latitude time plot us-
ing zonal mean TEC, TEC deviation, TEC rate, TEC gra-
dients, TEC forecasts, scintillation monitoring, ROTI, DIX,
slab thickness, ionosphere electron density and 3D TEC re-
constructions.
In addition to the warnings and routine information issued
continuously via the SWMC web page, a sequence of ad hoc re-
ports shall be provided in order to inform STCOs about unusu-
ally strong Space Weather events which have a potentially high
risk to strongly affect Space Traffic operations. The information
would be provided by email with human (plain text) and machine
readable (xml) content via an active warning system. This alert
notification shall provide products P-STM-17 to P-STM-20, cov-
ering the chain of causation from Sun to Earth with forecasts (P-
STM-18, P-STM-19), real-time (P-STM-17, P-STM-20) and all
clear (P-STM-20) information. The Space Weather incident pro-
tocol is executed if at least one of the following Space Weather
conditions is met:
• An X-class flare occurs
• A CME approaches from the visible solar disk with a speed
v > 1 000 km s−1
• Enhanced geomagnetic conditions: Kp> 6 and Dst<−150
• Onset of a radiation storm with E > 10 MeV and particle
fluxes > 104 particles s−1 cm−2 sr−1
• Significant impact on navigation and communication due to
ionospheric disturbances.
The SWMC is the entity responsible to collect and provide all
products and services to ATCOs and STCOs. Additional infor-
mation on envisaged tasks and responsibilities of the SWMC in
the context of space flight planning and scheduling are given in
Sect. 3.7.2.1.
3.6.4. Constraints on a SWMC Operations Concept
Regular and on-demand access to networks providing global
Space Weather observations is vital for a SWMC. This access
can only be granted if reliable international contracts with de-
pendable partners are in place. Hence, space agencies could be
18 of 30
R. Tüllmann et al.: On the Implementation of a European Space Traffic Management System
ideal candidates to operate a SWMC, as they are actively in-
volved in international collaborations and the negotiation of mul-
tilateral agreements and in that data access and usage is granted
for most space agencies.
An essential product for STM operations is the weekly or
daily SWB (P-STM-16) which provides all important informa-
tion in a human readable manner. The STCOs have to define the
delivery frequency of the SWBs according to their space flight
operations needs. The second mandatory service is the ad-hoc
information in case of strong and extreme Space Weather events
(P-STM-17). Ad hoc Space Weather event information has to be
provided in a human and machine readable format. A machine
readable format ensures the direct digestion of the information
into the ATM/STM system. In general, the SWMC should pro-
vide all Space Weather information in a preprocessed format ac-
cording to the needs of the STM. Provision of science data from
the Space Weather domain to the STM should be limited in or-
der to prevent misinterpretation by non-experts. Depending on
the given Space Weather information and risks, the STCO has
to issue adequate instructions or mitigation measures to the crew
aboard the SVVs. This requires that STCOs (and ATCOs) are
properly trained in order to allow for a correct decision making
process.
In addition to the ATM and STM interfaces, the SWMC
also needs to have interfaces to other European and international
regulatory organisations. At least two additional interfaces ap-
pear necessary, one to the ICAO and one to the WMO, as the
SWMC has to provide services to second ICAO’s international
SARPs and WMO observation and service requirements to pro-
tect against Space Weather hazards.
As already discussed by ICAO it might actually be necessary
to establish 2 – 3 regional SWMCs in Europe instead of just one
single centre. In this regard a prime-backup centre approach ap-
pears reasonable, because without a SWMC acting as backup,
service outages or downtimes could not be compensated (sin-
gle point of failure). In order to efficiently use resources and to
balance work loads, the prime centre could concentrate on daily
service operations (data processing and circulation), whereas the
backup centre would be responsible for the administration of all
Space Weather-related aspects (e.g., acting as point of contact for
official communication or conductor of negotiations for services,
products and contracts). Currently, ESA’s SSA programme is
building up such a coordination centre, but because this pro-
gramme is optional for EU member states and subject to the
geo-return policy, it appears questionable whether a stable net-
work of providing Space Weather services with long-term ser-
vice contracts can be granted. Therefore, it seems advisable to
establish a structural solution that guarantees continuous plan-
ning and Space Weather service provision.
3.6.5. Existing Warning Scales
The NOAA Warning Scale6 is the most frequently used Warning
scale for Space Weather Events. The scale distinguishes between
three different types of events. The Radio Blackout (R-Scale),
the Solar Radiation Storm (S-Scale) and the Geomagnetic Storm
(G-Scale). The three scales together give a good overview about
an incoming Space Weather event, but have certain issues to ex-
plain expected impacts on Earth with a sufficient good temporal
and regional resolution. The most important disadvantage of the
NOAA scale is, that no Ionospheric Scale exists, although this
would be highly desirable for many aviation and Space Traffic
6 See www.swpc.noaa.gov/NOAAscales for details
applications. In the following, we will comment on some aspects
of the different scales which could be improved.
The R-Scale uses GOES X-ray flux observations as driver.
Since GOES can be in the eclipse of the Earth and moon, it
might actually miss solar flares. The R-Scale provides informa-
tion about the expected impact of flare activities on the iono-
sphere to customers in the area of high frequency (HF) commu-
nication or precise positioning applications. Therefore, we sug-
gest, complementary to GOES, a ground based detection sys-
tem called Global Ionosphere Flare Detection System (GIFDS)
which is able to see all relevant flares starting from C-class up
to X-class (Wenzel et al. 2016). Since GIFDS measures directly
the flare impact in the Ionosphere, it is also ideal to measure the
impact for GNSS users.
The S-Scale uses GOES energetic particle observations with
energies above 10 MeV as driver. High-energy solar particle ra-
diation during solar storms can lead to strongly enhanced radi-
ation exposure and absorption of HF radio signals up to com-
plete disruption of communication, which is why the S-Scale
is insufficient in giving a good estimate of the expected ra-
diation exposure in aviation or Space Traffic. In this regard,
ground based measurements using the neutron monitor network
are much more suitable as they detect GLEs and give better in-
formation on the expected radiation exposure. Further advan-
tages to the S-Scale also promises the recently proposed D-index
which was designed for aviation industry (see Meier & Matthiä
(2014) for further details).
The G-Scale is driven by the geomagnetic Kp value, an in-
dex that is updated every three hours. The G-Scale is especially
important for HF communication, e.g., for satellite navigation
and positioning, to estimate the maximum usable frequencies, to
predict satellite communication losses and geomagnetic induced
currents. The information on geomagnetic storms is also of par-
ticular interest for STM purposes. However, the commonly used
3h-Kp index is not sufficient to fulfil operator needs, which is
why a better G-scale driver has to be defined with higher tempo-
ral resolution allowing for more accurate forecasts. Here, the Dst
index with one hour resolution might be a better choice. Alter-
natively, or complimentary to the Dst index, observations from
ACE and DSCOVR could also result in a good storm onset pre-
diction.
A very important scale for STM applications would be an
ionospheric scale. Unfortunately, such a scale has not been im-
plemented yet as its definition is very challenging due to regional
dependencies, temporal dependencies and frequency dependen-
cies of GNSS disturbances.
3.7. Integrating STM and ATM
In order to find integration points for merging STM and ATM
systems, the ATM Master Plan from 2015 was broken down into
high-level operational and organizational key areas and matched
with the corresponding areas of the envisaged STM system. The
result is presented in Figure 15, showing the overlapping set of
common areas as well as the set of complementing ones for ATM
and STM evolution. For implementing the Space Traffic Evo-
lution topics ATM procedures, concepts, products and Lessons
Learned must be applied as far as practical in order to build a
STM system that is compatible to ATM concepts and standards.
The topics listed in the brown area represent a subset of
key aspects common to both systems. Topics, such like safety
and reliability (S&R, including threat mitigation for remotely
piloted aircraft systems (RPAS)), data exchange strategies be-
tween ATM and STM, space debris and CRAs, Space Weather,
19 of 30
R. Tüllmann et al.: On the Implementation of a European Space Traffic Management System – I. A White Paper
 
 
Air Traffic Evolution Space Traffic Evolution 
• RPAS 
• Flight planning &  
   scheduling 
• Space debris & CRAs 
• Data transfer  
ATM  STM 
• Infrastructure Operations 
• HO 
• Space & Air Traffic M&C 
• S&R and Risks 
• Risks • Risks 
• Air Traffic Information  
                   System 
• Space Traffic Information  
System  
• Clean Space  
• Weather 
• Infrastructure development  
& safety concepts 
• Space Traffic Monitoring & 
Control (routine & cont.) 
• New Services, Products & 
Technologies 
• Environment (4D, noise) 
• Air Traffic Monitoring & 
Control (routine & conting.) 
• New Services, Products & 
Technologies ( SES) 
• Infrastructure development  
& safety concepts ( SES) 
• Space Weather 
• Standards & Regulations  
Figure 15: Common (brown) and complementing areas for ATM
and STM evolution (turquoise and orange) considered for merg-
ing ATM and STM systems.
space and air traffic M&C operations, flight planning or han-
dover/handback operations between ATCOs and STCOs touch
the interface between ATM and STM and require the develop-
ment of innovative operations concepts and modifications of ex-
isting risk standards to warrant a seamless ATM and STM inte-
gration and safe aerospace operations.
In the coming years, while the SES and NextGen concepts
are being implemented and the commercial space travel market
is still in its infancy, it is very likely that commercial p2p space
flights will operate globally fairly infrequently and only from a
handful of spaceports. Later, in a second stage, after space travel
technology has matured, S&R performance has approached that
in aviation and space travel gained public confidence, the global
space travel market is likely to grow. As a result, flights through
suborbital space will become increasingly more frequent and
launch and landing sites move closer to more populated areas
and business centres. During the final phase, p2p space travel is
routine, with dozens of flights per day from dedicated aerospace-
ports (airports with collocated spaceports).
In the course of STM evolution it is conceivable that in stage
one some of the hardware and technology, but also procedures
and standards designed for space flight operations, are allowed
to bypass some of the well-established ATM standards and op-
erations procedures (provided this does not conflict with safety
standards applicable at this time). During STM evolution (sec-
ond stage) those hardware, procedures and standards will con-
tinuously undergo regular evaluations and updates. For exam-
ple, space vehicles used for p2p space travel need to be quali-
fied and licensed for commercial space transportation and also
for flight according to aviation standards and regulations. In
addition, proper flight rules for operating in or near densely-
populated areas will have to be established without endangering
air traffic flows. In the final stage, space vehicles and space flight
operations are fully integrated with nominal ATM operations and
are 100% qualified for commercial passenger transportation.
The concept of space vehicle integration into civil airspace
generally calls for new route and separation standards to be laid
out by ICAO in order to allow for changes in airspace and pro-
cedure design with respect to spacecraft parameters and capa-
bilities. The challenge in this undertaking is the development of
generalized spacecraft categories, which reflect design layouts,
flight performance as well as operational profiles (e.g., booster
usage and jettison, re-entry with burn-off elements or manoeu-
vrability of the vessels). However, knowing the performance of
a spacecraft, such as climb rate, speed and turn radius is crucial
for an ATCO to safely manage air traffic. It has therefore to be
determined if a true separation standard similar to today’s stan-
dards for civil aircraft can be found or if the common practice of
temporarily reserved airspaces is the only way forward.
On the one hand, reserved airspace for launching and landing
space vehicles is in strong contrast to a capacity-friendly ATM
concept as envisaged in the SES initiative, but on the other hand,
if separation standards for spacecraft become prohibitively large
due to their diverse operational profiles, temporary airspace solu-
tions might be a better option. In the communication, navigation
and surveillance (CNS) domain, the communication element in
the STM context can be considered as comparable to current avi-
ation practices, i.e. radio communication or digital (space-based)
communication, whereas the navigation domain for spacecraft
remains to be analysed. In the context of Performance Based
Navigation (PBN, see ICAO 2008), it would be highly desirable
to standardise spacecraft trajectory management in an RNP-like
(Required Navigation Performance) format. RNP is defined as
the accuracy of the navigation performance required for opera-
tions in a particular airspace. It is expressed by the distance to the
intended position (target position) that an aircraft must comply
with in at least 95% of the total flight time. This navigation accu-
racy is based on a combination of errors of the navigation sensor,
the on-board receiver, the on-board display and the aeronautical
error in the horizontal plane (see e.g., ICAO 2008; Eurocontrol
2013). Following these existing navigation concepts, it should be
possible to derive route spacing and traffic separation standards
based on ICAO’s current collision risk modelling techniques.
The element of surveillance has to find proper sensor data
fusion concepts to fill the gap between orbital tracking technol-
ogy and aviation surveillance systems, such as radar, multilat-
eration or independent surveillance broadcast, which nowadays
is limited to altitudes of ∼60 000 ft (FL650). For spacecraft re-
entry tracking the challenge will likely be to perform data transi-
tion between space tracking networks and aviation surveillance
tools. Hence, it appears that the biggest challenge in integrating
space vehicles into civil airspace is the navigation domain, where
no standards yet exist for the space vehicle’s movements in the
lower atmosphere. In order to ensure the ATM system’s sustain-
able set of standards, the most practical solution would therefore
be to integrate space vehicle navigation into the existing set of
RNP parameters.
3.7.1. Tasks and Responsibilities of STCOs
Similar to the role definition of ATCOs, the role of STCOs could
be defined. In general, STCOs perform M&C operations for
manned and unmanned space vehicles by tracking and direct-
ing them through controlled aerospace above FL650. In addi-
tion, STCOs could provide support and advisory services to crew
aboard the spacecraft, such as providing ad hoc SWBs, assisting
in conflict de-escalations of on-board incidents or issuing colli-
sion avoidance measures. Based on the definition of the separa-
tion concept between spacecraft and civil aircraft, the STCO’s
primary responsibility would be to ensure a seamless and safe
integration of spaceplanes into the air traffic flow and preventing
collisions between spacecraft, aircraft and debris.
In case a spaceplane crosses FL650 in either direction, cor-
responding handover and handback operations between STCOs
and ATCOs are required. This step ensures a clean separation
of responsibilities in that ATCOs are responsible for guiding
spaceplanes through airspace up to FL650 and STCOs take over
responsibilities above that level. This handover can be com-
pared with and is similar to handover procedures between two
airspaces controlled by different countries that are used in civil
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ATM. The following list provides a high-level summary of en-
visaged tasks and responsibilities of a STCO:
• Communicate with interfaces (e.g., ATCOs, STCOs,
SWMC, ESSTraC, pilots or spaceports)
• Perform pre-departure checks on system, flight and space-
craft status (double-check independent from ATCO)
• Check if all products from Flight Planning and Scheduling
(see Sec. 3.7.2), such as flight plans, trajectories, flight corri-
dors and their corresponding backups and contingency plans,
have been uploaded and validated by flight crew
• Provide Go/No Go decisions for departure to ATCO (double-
check)
• Perform handover and handback operations with ATCO once
spacecraft reaches FL650
• Check accuracy of spacecraft’s (re-)entry points and trajec-
tory and issue corrective manoeuvres or the execution of
backup and contingency plans if indicated
• Perform routine M&C operations as well as contingency op-
erations
• Provide ad hoc SWBs to pilot in case Space Weather condi-
tions change and endanger passengers and crew aboard the
vessel
• Perform Special Operations (e.g., provide data on request for
incident investigations, assist in conflict de-escalation in case
of incidents aboard the spacecraft).
3.7.2. Possible Interfaces for STCOs
Now, that initial tasks and responsibilities for STCOs have been
defined in the STM context, the following interfaces for com-
bined ATM and STM operations are needed:
• Flight Planning & Scheduling Operations
• Air Traffic Control Operations
• Space Traffic Control Operations
• Ground Operations at Airports and Spaceports
• Spaceplane Operations.
In the context of the ROS outlined in Figure 1, a high-level
task description is presented for each of these interfacing areas
explaining their envisaged mutual interaction during the differ-
ent flight phases, from pre-departure operations, to in-flight op-
erations and post-arrival operations.
3.7.2.1. Flight Planning & Scheduling Operations
A completely new branch of operations requiring the design, de-
velopment and validation of new requirements, procedures, ele-
ments and infrastructure in the STM context is related to Flight
Planning and Scheduling (FPS). At least in the early stages
of commercial space travel, FPS is expected to be very differ-
ent from routine FPS operations in the aviation sector and al-
though there are obvious similarities and many processes might
be shared between STM and ATM, STM is not considered to be
a scale model of today’s ATM, but rather an independent add-on.
Regarding STM, FPS is related to the generation of space
flight plans for p2p connections and their corresponding schedul-
ing. FPS is subject to dynamic traffic flows in aerospace, to risk
assessments made by external entities (such as ESSTraC and the
SWMC), to flight corridor handling, contingency and backup
planning operations. For STM and ATM to safely integrate SSVs
and spaceplanes, the risks posed by those vehicles to aviation
business should be in line with today’s ATM risks. In other
words, for commercial space travel to evolve the risk to people
sharing airspace should not change, irrespective of which type of
vessel is considered (see Paper II for further details). Similarly,
the risks to people traveling through suborbital or LEO space
aboard the vessel (e.g., resulting from Space Weather or colli-
sions with spacecraft and debris) as well as the risk to people on
ground (e.g., resulting from crashing vehicles, falling debris or
re-entering objects) shall be acceptable (for initial numbers see
Paper II).
In order to estimate those risks, accurate global tracking of
objects entering LEO and suborbital space, such as re-entering
SSVs, satellites or space debris, down to a still to be defined min-
imum object size and 24/7 monitoring of Space Weather events
is mandatory. Based on these measurements collision risks can
be quantified and decisions can be made on the best and safest
trajectory that causes the least disturbance to air traffic.
Because the entry/re-entry points to/from suborbital space
are not always exactly known in advance (e.g., contingen-
cies aboard the SSV or Space Weather hazards could require
unplanned manoeuvres), the spaceplane’s deviation from the
planned trajectory needs to be closely monitored and adjusted
in case those deviations become too large to allow for a safe in-
tegration of the space vessel into the current air traffic flow. The
trajectory tracking and corrective manoeuvre calculations could
be performed by data processing service centres hosted at the
sites that perform object tracking and Space Weather monitoring
and prediction. In this context these entities would be ESSTraC
and the SWMC (cf. Sects. 3.4 and 3.6.2, respectively).
Given the high frequency and complexity of FPS operations
and the required timeliness of the data products, manual oper-
ations are not feasible. Therefore, we propose the development
of a dedicated element, the Flight Planning and Scheduling Fa-
cility (FPSF), which automatically performs all necessary steps,
from generating initial flight plans to flight scheduling with re-
spect to risk and trajectory computations provided by ESSTraC,
Space Weather warnings disseminated by the SWMC and exist-
ing air traffic flows taken from the Air Traffic Control (ATC)
flight database. The envisioned high-level technical layout is
provided in Figure 16.
In this concept, the FPSF is part of the STM domain and has
one internal interface with Space Traffic Control (STC), a sub-
domain of STM, and external interfaces with ESSTraC, SWMC
and Air Traffic Control (ATC) which is a subdomain of the ATM
domain. The FPSF comprises two main elements, the Planning
Facility and the Scheduling Facility. The Planning Facility gen-
erates a first rough Master Flight Plan (MFP) for all aircraft and
spacecraft movements through aerospace planned for a given
date by sorting all flight plans submitted to the ATC and STC
Flight Databases according to departure time. The MFP is then
processed by the FPSF’s Scheduling Facility which issues re-
quests to ESSTraC to start calculating safe (collision-free) space-
craft trajectories for the individual flight plans stored in the MFP,
to determine appropriately sized flight corridors for the space ve-
hicles and to the SWMC to generate Space Weather predictions
for the given space flights.
For each issued request, ESSTraC would perform trajectory
calculations from departure Spaceport A to destination Space-
port B by considering the individual performance profile of the
spaceplane, assuming a set of different orbit parameters (e.g.,
by varying inclination or departure time), checking the num-
ber of objects (e.g., debris or aircraft) within a certain miss-
distance from the spaceplane and ranking the results according
to safety requirements (e.g., according to largest miss-distance
or time span of collision-free space). Each of these ranked so-
lutions would contain a validity keyword that informs about the
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Figure 16: Layout of the Flight Planning and Scheduling Facility
with its internal and external interfaces.
time slot during which the minimum miss-distance is exceeded
and the calculated trajectory and departure time can be safely
used (cf. Sect. 3.4.1). Based on the top-ranked trajectories for
a given flight plan and the expected air traffic flow at departure
and re-entry, ESSTraC will also assign an appropriately-sized
flight corridor to the space vehicle, i.e. a safety buffer of blocked
airspace, whose extent is dependent on manoeuvrability, climb
rate and turn radius of the vessel.
Similarly, the SWMC would predict Space Weather condi-
tions and hazardous events and issue a corresponding report to
the Scheduling Facility covering the anticipated flight period
plus some minutes before and after the expected departure and
arrival time to compensate for potential launch delays resulting
from collision risk assessments.
The Scheduling Facility now takes all data received from ES-
STraC and the SWMC for a particular flight plan and determines
the optimal flight path through air and space, i.e. the safest tra-
jectory and departure time. This procedure is repeated for each
entry in the MFP and the scheduling can be performed accord-
ing to destination spaceport and departure time. The final MFP
is then handed back to the Planning Facility which copies it to
the ATC and STC Flight Databases. In case of flight delays ex-
ceeding a to be defined threshold, the Planning Facility would
identify the affected flights and issue a request to the Scheduling
Facility which would trigger ESSTraC to re-evaluate the flight
trajectories and perform adequate adjustments in case they are
needed. Finally, the updated MFP would be transferred back to
the Planning Facility and to the ATC and STC flight databases,
respectively.
Although the Scheduling Facility would perform continu-
ous and fully automated updates of flight plans, trajectories,
flight corridors, backup and contingency data on a 24/7 basis
(requiring synchronised data transfers to/from ESSTraC and the
SWMC), a User Interface (UI) is essential. The UI is needed to
interact with the whole process chain, e.g., to manually insert
new flight plans or to trigger on-demand trajectory calculations
or optimisations).
In case of unforeseen events, such like breakup events of re-
entering objects in the atmosphere (to be tracked by the Global
Sensor and Tracking Network) or Space Weather hazards (to be
detected by the Space Weather Monitoring Network), an alert
will have to be issued by ESSTraC or the SWMC that informs
the ATCO/STCO on duty and automatically triggers the re-
calculation of needed flight data. This ensures that always the
highest safety level for passengers aboard aircraft and spacecraft
as well as for people on the ground is ensured. Once safety-
compliant flight plans have been generated, they could be made
accessible to ATCOs, STCOs and other personnel with a need
to know, e.g., via the System-Wide Information Management
(SWIM) system (see e.g., Drescher et al. 2016) developed for
the SES initiative.
3.7.2.2. Air Traffic Control Operations
One important aspect in the interface between STCOs and
ATCOs is the coordination and transfer of control, which should
be similar to today’s transfer of control of flights between adja-
cent area control centres. The coordination process to transfer a
flight from one centre to another is quite complex and needs to
satisfy a certain set of agreed rules. Coordination has to start at
a predetermined amount of time before a flight reaches a bound-
ary. This time is usually agreed by the states involved. Coor-
dination for the transfer of control involves information about
the flight identity, the point on the boundary at which the flight
is expected to fly, the estimated time, the flight level and the
Secondary Surveillance Radar code. The actual flight plan of
the spacecraft would be also transferred automatically between
STCOs, ATCOs and pilots.
In the past, the transfer of control of a flight between adja-
cent control centres was mainly performed directly between con-
trollers connected through designated telephone systems. This
method significantly increases the workload of the controllers,
is relatively slow and error-prone. In the early 1990’s, Eurocon-
trol developed a standard to support the exchange of flight plan
data and messages in electronic format. This standard is known
as On-Line Data Interchange (OLDI). It ensures that the mes-
sages exchanged between adjacent centres are always valid and
up-to-date. In total, 40 OLDI messages have been developed of
which today only a few are actually used for ATC operations. Of
course, transfer of communication needs also to be established
as part of the transfer of control procedure. The timing where
transfer of control is executed could be at the point where the
flight path crosses the boundary of FL650 or with reference to
an agreed coordination point.
Similar to ATM, impacts from Space Weather, collision
avoidance measures, weather conditions or traffic situations at
the destination spaceport, can determine the actual start time of a
spaceplane and therefore directly influence its flight plan. ATM
distinguishes between the Estimated Off-Block Time (EOBT -
which is the estimated time at which the aircraft will commence
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movement associated with departure), the Scheduled Off-Block
Time (SOBT - which is the time that an aircraft is scheduled to
depart from its parking position), and the Actual Off-Block Time
(AOBT - which is the time the aircraft pushes back and vacates
the parking position). If a spaceplane misses the SOBT a new
time slot needs to be assigned and communicated to the pilot. In
case of delays that are not covered by the safety margins stored in
the validity keyword provided by ESSTraC (meaning that some
space debris along the planned flight path comes too close to the
spacecraft as a consequence of the delay on ground), new and
probably manually triggered trajectories would need to be cal-
culated by ESSTraC and transferred to ATCOs, STCOs and to
the pilot of the spacecraft.
As part of the evolution of the European ATM, the work of
ATCOs shall also be significantly facilitated. However, inserting
spaceplanes into the aviation sector will likely result in addi-
tional tasks and responsibilities which, however, should not in-
crease the overall workload beyond reasonable limits. Besides
the tasks covered by ATCOs today and in the context of SES, the
following supplemental STM-related activities are anticipated:
• Communication with interfaces (e.g., ATCOs, STCOs,
SWMC, ESSTraC, pilots or spaceports)
• Provision of Go/No Go decisions for departure to STCOs
(double-check)
• Performance of routine M&C operations for spaceplanes
as well as contingency operations below FL650, including
flight corridor adjustments in case of high air traffic loads
• Performance of pre-departure checks on system, flight and
spacecraft status (double-check independent from STCOs)
• Performance of Special Operations (e.g., provision of data
on request for incident investigations, assistance in conflict
de-escalation in case of incidents aboard the spacecraft)
• Performance of handover and handback operations with
STCOs once spacecraft reaches FL650
• Checking the accuracy of the (re-)entry point and trajectory
of a spaceplane and issuing corrective manoeuvres or exe-
cuting backup and contingency plans if indicated
• Provision of ad hoc SWBs to space pilots in case Space
Weather conditions change and endanger passengers and
crew aboard the vessel
• Performance of checks to see if all products from FPS, such
as flight plans, trajectories, flight corridors and their cor-
responding backups and contingency plans, have been up-
loaded and validated by flight crew.
Except for the last four bullets, the envisaged ATCO operations
are not much different from today’s.
3.7.2.3. Spaceplane Operations
Although tasks and responsibilities envisaged for pilots op-
erating space vehicles would share some similarities with those
performed by pilots in the aviation business, there are some dis-
tinctly different activities. The following tasks and responsibili-
ties are anticipated:
• Perform pre-departure system checks and start-up proce-
dures (including upload and validation of flight data received
from ATCO)
• Perform routine spaceplane operations in airspace up to
FL650
• Communication with ATCOs, STCOs, ATC, STC and space-
port (e.g., on trajectory adjustments, runway, taxiing, parking
position, etc.)
• Provide Go/No Go decisions for departure to ATCO and
STCO (double-check)
• Communication with passengers and crew (in routine and
contingency situations)
• Perform contingency operations, such as take-off and land-
ing aborts, evasive manoeuvres or execution of contingency
flight plans (e.g., in case of technical failures or collisions
with space debris), either independently or if instructed by
ATCOs and STCOs
• Perform handover and handback operations with ATCOs
once spacecraft reaches FL650
• Perform routine spaceplane operations in space above FL650
• Perform trajectory checks and corrective manoeuvres if au-
thorised/instructed by ATCOs or STCOs
• React on ad hoc collision warnings and/or Space Weather
alerts received from ATCOs and STCOs and follow their in-
structions on risk mitigation
• Perform post-arrival operations, such as system checks,
spaceplane handover to other crews or system shutdown
• Perform Special Operations (e.g., provide data on request for
incident investigations, actively pursue conflict de-escalation
in case of incidents aboard the spacecraft).
3.7.2.4. Ground Operations at Airports and Spaceports
Ground operations at airports and spaceports are expected to
be very similar, so that this area would require the least develop-
ment effort among the interfaces discussed in this section. The
following activities and tasks are expected:
• Perform 24/7 ground infrastructure maintenance (terminals,
launch pads, CNS equipment, etc.)
• Perform spaceplane maintenance (on request)
• Communicate with ATCOs, spaceport authorities, pilots
(e.g., on scheduled maintenance work, goods supply for
spaceplane, safety and security issues, etc.)
• Perform safety and security operations (e.g., regular safety
checks of relevant infrastructure, RPAS mitigation, passen-
ger screenings, etc.)
• Provide and maintain terminal and passenger information
services
• Provide and maintain the Air Traffic Information System
(ATIS) and Space Traffic Information System (STIS) ser-
vices
• Perform Special Operations (e.g., provide data on request for
incident investigations).
All tasks and activities described for the aforementioned inter-
faces are fully covered by the ROS presented in Figure 1.
3.7.3. Suggested STM Add-ons to the SES Concept
In order to visualise Europe’s main deficiencies in the STM and
SES context, Figure 17 was taken from the ATM Master Plan
(2015, cf. Figure 8) and has been adapted to also include the sup-
plemental add-on components and services suggested for STM
purposes (see boxes highlighted in yellow).
The following add-ons to the SES Master Plan are proposed:
1) Space Weather services and products need to be added
2) Collision risk assessments and trajectory calculations are
needed
3) Integrated (ATM & STM) Flight Planning and Scheduling is
needed
4) Handover and handback operations between ATCOs &
STCOs are needed.
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Figure 17: Supplemental STM add-ons (shown in yellow) required for integrating STM with the evolving ATM system as envisaged
in the SES context (this Figure was originally taken from the ATM Master Plan (2015) and modified accordingly).
Add-ons 1) and 2) require the establishment of ESSTraC and the
proposed SWMC together with appropriate operations concepts
and globally operating sensor networks while add-ons 3) and 4)
imply a close collaboration between the ATM sector and future
STM key players to develop and implement the FPSF and suit-
able operations procedures.
3.7.4. Flight Corridor Handling for Spaceplanes
In ATM vertical and horizontal separation standards are defined
in order to facilitate safe navigation of aircraft in controlled
airspace. With the help of these separation standards the ATCO
ensures that the distance between aircraft in all three dimensions
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Figure 18: Evolution of Flight Corridor Handling.
does not fall below certain minima. In general, minimum sep-
aration varies with the different phases of the flight, depend-
ing on the available navigation and control systems. The basic
radar separation, for example, is five nautical miles whereas na-
tional separation standards are based on the provisions given in
ICAO Document 4444. In recent years, it was possible to reduce
the vertical separation due to improved methods of measuring
heights. For integrating SSVs and spaceplanes into civil airspace
adequate separation concepts have to be defined. As shown in
Figure 18, there are basically four types of separation concepts
that can be applied to maintain a safe distance between conven-
tional aircraft and ascending or re-entering spacecraft.
The first concept is applied today and involves a broad-scale
airspace closure around the space vehicle. It can be compared
with air corridors in ATM that are mainly used for military pur-
poses in order to ensure safe operations in civil airspace. Air
corridors that are limited in space and time are not controlled by
ATCOs, they just take care that no aircraft is entering the blocked
airspace. This concept is clearly the most capacity-constraining
one and therefore requires major adjustments in the future when
commercial p2p space travel commences.
The second concept builds up on the first approach by con-
sidering the space vehicle’s vertical and lateral navigation per-
formance during ascent and re-entry and can thereby reduce the
lateral containment area based on the individual navigation per-
formance. This could lead to considerable capacity increase de-
pending on the predictability level of spacecraft operations in
atmospheric flight phases. This is currently the critical element
which prevents further progress in this area, since space vehicles
are not certified or even tested to fulfil certain navigation criteria
comparable to civil aviation standards (e.g. RNP values).
The third concept would be an even tighter containment area
based on the in-flight navigation performance of the spacecraft
which is currently uncharted territory as no relevant standards
for spacecraft exit yet.
Finally, the fourth concept defines a three-dimensional co-
moving space around the space vehicle as a non-penetration
zone, similar to today’s separation concept between conven-
tional aircraft in controlled airspace. This concept, however, rep-
resents the case where space vessels are fully integrated into
the routine air traffic flow and requires the highest level of ac-
curacy regarding position and time. Today, this concept is far
from being realized for spacecraft operations. Especially when a
spacecraft scatters debris during its ascent or re-entry phase, the
three-dimensional probability distribution for the spaceplane’s
position becomes increasingly complex and clearly reduces the
chance for small containment spaces similar to those applied by
current civil aviation navigation standards (see RNP concept ref-
erence ICAO 2008).
However, even fully functional spacecraft would require a
navigation specification (technical and operational specifications
that identify the navigation performance) which is compatible to
aviation standards in order to apply concepts of route and radar
separation and airspace design principles which reflect naviga-
tion accuracy and cross-track deviation probabilities. So gener-
ally speaking, the more airplane-like the in-flight performance
of a spaceplane, the easier its integration into the air traffic flow.
As mentioned in Sect. 3.1, there are currently three dif-
ferent kinds of SSV/spaceplane concepts: HOTOLs (e.g.,
Skylon or the Spaceplane), VTOLs (e.g., New Shepard)
and Hybrids (e.g., SpaceLiner or air launch systems like
WhiteKnight2+ SpaceShip2). Because the in-air performance of
these vessels (like degree of steerability, climb rate, minimum
turn radius), remains currently unknown, it is not possible to de-
termine appropriate segregation requirements for these vessels
to be safely integrated into routine air traffic flows. To the very
least, some constraints on the handling of possible flight corri-
dors can be given for those vehicles.
3.7.4.1. Flight Corridor Handling for HOTOLs
For HOTOLs an airplane-like in air performance with full ma-
noeuvrability is assumed. In this regard Skylon would be cer-
tified according to airplane requirements (e.g., EASA CS 25)
which would result in a definition of minimum separation re-
quirements similar to aviation standards. Therefore, it is consid-
ered relatively straight forward to integrate these vessels into the
day-to-day air traffic flow which would have the big commercial
advantage that no air space needs to be closed and the impact on
flight schedules would be minimal.
3.7.4.2. Flight Corridor Handling for VTOLs
It is assumed that this type of vessel has very limited manoeu-
vring capabilities (e.g., cannot perform evasive manoeuvres,
one-directional flight path, no lateral steerability). Because of
these constraints, the vehicle is unlikely to become certified ac-
cording to aviation standards. In this case it has to be shown
that risks during take-off and during ascent/descent up/down to
FL650 is compliant to aviation standards. In addition, it has to
be demonstrated that the launch failure probability meets avia-
tion requirements.
The limited steerability is expected to make it hard to in-
tegrate VTOLs into the air traffic flow. To mitigate the risks,
separation standards need to be based on the navigation perfor-
mance and reliability of the vessel and closure of airspace might
be required. Regarding risks and air space closure, VTOL con-
cepts could benefit from sound experience with the Space Shut-
tle. Contrary to HOTOLs significant impacts on flight schedules
and substantial costs due to airspace closure are expected.
3.7.4.3. Flight Corridor Handling for Hybrids
For hybrids it is assumed that the space vessel has some manoeu-
vring capabilities (e.g., can perform simple evasive manoeuvres
25 of 30
R. Tüllmann et al.: On the Implementation of a European Space Traffic Management System – I. A White Paper
in airspace) and glides down during descent (e.g., like the Space
Shuttle). In case a carrier aircraft is used, this aircraft is expected
to comply with aviation standards. Should the space vehicle also
be certified according to aviation standards, the whole concept
could be treated like a HOTOL, i.e. no air space blocking would
be required resulting in minimum impacts on the flight schedule.
Should, however, the space vehicle not be certified according
to aviation standards, it needs to be proven that the risks during
take-off and ascent/descent up/down to FL650 is compliant to
aviation standards and that the launch failure probability is also
consistent with aviation requirements.
Integrating the vessel into the air traffic flow should be fea-
sible. For risk mitigation purposes, separation standards for hy-
brids should be based on in-air performance and reliability of
the landing vessel. Closure of airspace might be required. Tim-
ing and size of the airspace to be blocked should be determined
by the performance and reliability of the landing vessel (ground
track of the vessel should be avoided). Regarding risks and air
space closure, hybrid concepts could benefit from sound experi-
ence with the Space Shuttle. Moderate impacts on flight sched-
ules and acceptable costs due to airspace closure are expected.
Space objects, like re-entering spaceplanes or Space Debris,
can pose a significant risk to airspace users and people and in-
frastructure on ground. These risks are discussed in Paper II
(Tüllmann et al. 2017b) where the need to quantify these risks
has been identified and initial values for an acceptable level of
safety are proposed. It is expected that ATM and the aviation in-
dustry contribute to further studies, with the final objective to be
able to make informed decisions regarding traffic re-routing or
size and duration of airspace closure (if closure is in fact needed)
for each predicted re-entry event, depending on object size, lo-
cation and air traffic density.
3.8. Key Players and Stakeholders in STM
The increasing number of worldwide private space launches to-
gether with the flood of expected CubeSat deployments and
Mega-Constellations planned by OneWeb, SpaceX or Boeing
will almost certainly result in a heavy competition for limited or-
bit space. This in turn may provoke spacecraft accidents which
are likely to cause conflicts and bring up legal issues among
those parties who own the spacecraft.
Without doubt, space and airspace will move closer together
in the next decades, which is why an international and globally
recognised authority is needed that has the power to enact bind-
ing regulations and coordinates and stabilises access to space
for civil institutions and commercial companies to mitigate con-
flicts and to prevent accidents which may even put human lives
at stake. This international authority should also act under the
auspices of the United Nations, here the UNOOSA. In this re-
gard a well established candidate already working on STM is
ICAO. Besides its current duties, ICAO could also have to take
on all relevant tasks and responsibilities dedicated to civil and
commercial Space Traffic Management.
In the European context, there are at least three main author-
ities that should be considered, i.e. Eurocontrol (performing safe
ATM operations), the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA,
performing regulatory and executive tasks in the field of civilian
aviation safety and environmental regulations) and ESA (which
could act as prime advisory agency for EASA on technical STM-
related matters). ESA could have direct technical and manage-
rial interfaces with STM as well as with spaceports and external
STM service providers, such as ESSTraC and the SWMC.
EASA
ATM & ATC
Airports
ESA
UN
(UNOOSA)
International 
Organisations
European 
Organisations
Regional 
Entities
ICAO, ...
Air Traffic Control Operator: 
· Air Traffic Services (e.g., Air Traffic 
M&C, ATIS, MET)
· Procedure development
· Safety management
· Training
Space Traffic Control Operator:
· Space Traffic Services (e.g., Space 
Traffic M&C, SWBs, STIS)
· Procedure development
· Safety management
· Training
Interfacing activities
· M&C operations of air and space traffic
· FPS operations for air-and spaceplanes
· Handover and handback operations for spaceplanes 
entering or leaving airspace (FL600)
· Cross Training, incident prevention and 
investigation
ESSTraC
SWMC
AIR
Space
meets
Eurocontrol
STM & STC
Spaceports
Figure 19: A possible interplay between global, European and
regional STM key players in the area of Air & Space Traffic
Management. Entities marked in red do not yet exist and need
to be established. In this vision, ESA acts as the prime advisory
agency for the EASA on all space traffic-related matters.
Space vehicles landing and starting in/from European terri-
tory will need to be included into existing European ATM sys-
tems, while spacecraft entering or leaving suborbital or LEO
space need to be routinely monitored and managed by dedicated
STM systems operated by Europe and international partners.
Both kinds of ATM and STM control mechanisms may need re-
gional solutions, e.g., over oceanic and polar regions or in the
grey zone where Space Traffic volumes do not overlap. However,
24/7 operations at a global level are necessary as frequent han-
dover and handback operations for spaceplanes passing through
aerospace are required. An organisational breakdown with possi-
ble key players in a European Air & Space Traffic Management
system is shown in Figure 19. Global, European and regional
entities for air traffic control are listed and potential counterparts
from a high-level assessment of the Space Traffic domain are
highlighted.
In the context of expected STM activities, ESA will have
a unique opportunity to open up new fields of activities thanks
to its technical know-how in space business and expertise in
managing international space projects. Most importantly, ESA
is considered to have a key role in interfacing with the space
sector in the following areas:
• Development and implementation of the ESSTraC
• Defining ESSTraC evolution
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• Acting as prime advisory agency for EASA or Eurocontrol
on all space-related matters
• Defining CNS core technologies and requirements
• Interfacing with other space agencies, such as NASA (e.g.,
on negotiating agreements for Space Weather or SST data
exchange)
• Performing technical M&C of the recently established Eu-
ropean Space Surveillance Tracking Network (ESSTN)
through ESSTraC
• Providing regular and accurate space environment data in the
context of SSA through the SWMC.
The following roles and responsibilities are envisaged for ESA:
• Develop a roadmap for EASA/Eurocontrol to implement the
technical STM aspects into the existing ATM system
• Advise EASA/Eurocontrol on Space Traffic-related issues
(e.g., oversight of regional Space Traffic authorities, com-
panies and industry)
• Supervise ESSTraC to provide regularly accurate tracking
data, CRAs and SWBs
• Steer technology development and Space Traffic evolution in
Europe
• Advise EASA/Eurocontrol on Space Safety Management
and technical aspects regarding the certification of Space
Navigation Service Providers (SNSPs)
• Define and perform testing of space products and equipment
(e.g., CNS, avionics)
• Provision of requirements and advisory to
EASA/Eurocontrol on licensing and certification of
commercial launchers and spaceports
• Perform investigations of aerospace Traffic accidents
• Certification of Training Products.
3.9. The Roadmap for a European STM System
In this section the initial roadmap for the implementation of the
proposed European STM system is provided, reflecting all con-
cepts, constraints and key results that have been derived in previ-
ous sections. For simplicity reasons, the whole STM implemen-
tation process is assumed to start in January 2017 and would be
finished from a technical point of view when routine p2p space
travel (e.g., with a Skylon-like spaceplane) commences. In order
to at least roughly constrain the year when commercial subor-
bital flights could start in Europe and the STM framework needs
to be in place, the following three main areas of development
should to be considered.
The first one is related to technology development and to
building the spaceplane (see upper panel in Figure 20). In this
regard, we already pointed out in Sect. 3.1 that the most promis-
ing European spaceplane candidate is Skylon. According to REL,
this vessel is expected to enter the flight test phase by 2025 (BBC
News 2015) and could be become operational by 2030 if we as-
sume a 5-year time frame for testing and certification.
In order to support routine and safe Skylon operations, the
second development area, infrastructure, needs to be ready (see
middle panel in Figure 20). The infrastructure consists of space-
ports, support buildings and communication networks. This
would set a milestone prior to 2030, so possibly something in
the range from 2028 to 2030 at the latest.
The third and final area is related to the development and val-
idation of products and services (lower panel in Figure 20), such
as a STM concept, a concept for 24/7 routine and contingency
Space Traffic M&C operations or Space Weather and SST prod-
ucts. Clearly, these products have to be ready and validated be-
fore spaceport operations and p2p Space Traffic can commence.
2017 
R & D 
2025 
SABRE Engine  
operational 
Verification &  
Validation 
Commercial operations 
2030 
Skylon  
operational 
Spaceplane  
technology  
development 
2017 
R & D 
2023 
Spaceport  
construction 
Verification &  
Validation 
2028 
Spaceport  
certification 
Spaceport  
construction &  
certification 
Commercial operations 
2017 
R & D 
2022 
Product  
verification & 
validation 
Verification &  
Validation 
2026 
Product 
marketing & 
distribution 
Product  
development &  
validation  
Product distribution & maintenance 
2021 
First US  
commercial   
space travel 
2020 
EU Spaceport  
readiness if to 
serve US market 
2019 
Product  
readiness  
if to serve  
US market 
Figure 20: Milestones for a European Space Traffic market.
For this, a time frame between 2026 and 2028 is adopted. If we
consider a verification and validation period of about 4 years, the
initial products should be ready for testing by 2022. This year
would then set the milestone against which has to be developed,
built and tested, a target date that looks ambitious, but possible
to reach if work would actually start without delay in 2017.
However, the whole scenario is more pressing if Europe were
to serve additional demands of the U.S. commercial space travel
market (see milestones highlighted in grey in Figure 20). Be-
cause the U.S. has a head start with respect to technology and
infrastructure development, Space Travel is estimated to start in
the U.S. around the 2020s, which would require European in-
frastructure and products to be ready by the same time, provided
Europe intends to accommodate landings and take-offs of Amer-
ican space vessels on European soil.
Among the three areas of development outlined in Figure 10,
the most critical one, without neither space flight operations nor
spaceport operations are possible, is the timely development of
products and services, such as the development of a STM system
and its integration with the ATM. These tasks are not straight for-
ward to implement, partly because the topic of Space Traffic is
currently ignored in the Single European Sky initiative of the EU
(e.g., the SESAR European ATM Master Plan in its 5th edition
from 2015, does not even mention the word “Space Traffic” and
“space” is mentioned only in terms of “airspace”) and partly be-
cause many interfaces are missing or need to be re-defined. In ad-
dition, reliability and safety requirements need to be defined and
harmonised between the aviation and space flight sectors and a
common European legislation needs to be found. Especially the
latter is likely to become a very time-consuming process.
However, if we would include Air Traffic Evolution as en-
visaged in the ATM Master Plan and consider that upgrades of
the ATM might also affect STM evolution, the whole ATM and
STM implementation process could be delayed until 2035.
For reasons of clarity only a high-level version has been
generated from the original roadmap which contains more than
120 tasks. This simplified version is presented in Figure 21 and
focusses primarily on those aspects that have been discussed
in this paper, namely Space Debris and SST (see orange bars
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Start
Mon 07/11/16
Finish
Mon 31/12/35
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036
Implementing SES evolutions (ongoing)
Mon 07/11/16 - Mon 31/12/35
Requirements 
Mon 02/01/17 -  
Requirements 
Mon 02/01/17 -  
Development & Implementation of environmental aspects
Mon 02/01/17 - Fri 30/06/28
SNSP certification  
Mon 02/01/17 - Fri  
SES 
Mon 
Sensor network implementation & testing
Fri 29/12/17 - Fri 01/10/21
Implementation 
Tue 02/01/18 -  
Operations concept  
Mon 02/07/18 - Fri  
Implementation of SES gaps
Tue 08/01/19 - Thu 31/10/30
FPS implementation
Tue 08/01/19 - Mon 06/07/26
Operations concept implementation & validation (incl. Space Traffic M&C)
Mon 30/12/19 - Tue 30/06/26
Sensor network implementation & testing
Thu 02/01/20 - Fri 30/12/22
S&R concept imlpementattion
Tue 30/06/20 - Fri 29/12/28
Product testing
Thu 01/07/21 - Fri  
Product testing
Thu 01/07/21 - Fri  
P&S Validation, Testing & Certification
Mon 02/01/23 - Tue 30/06/26
FPS Testing & Validation
Tue 07/07/26 - Tue 06/02/29
Spaceport 
Tue 04/01/28 
Spaceplane 
Thu 
SES Gaps PDR
Mon 07/01/19
STM PDR
Mon 06/01/20
SWMC ORR
Mon 02/01/23
ESTC ORR
Mon 23/01/23
Commercial P&S  
distribution
Wed 01/07/26
ECS ORR
Fri 30/06/28
S&R ORR
Fri 12/01/29
Routine spaceport  
operations
Thu 01/02/29
STM system ORR
Wed 28/02/29
Spaceplane FRR
Mon 04/11/30
Today
Figure 21: The high-level STM Roadmap. Environmental aspects including Clean Space (green bar) and Safety & Reliability (blue
bars) are not discussed in this paper and are shown here for the sake of completeness.
and Sect. 3.4), Space Weather Monitoring (see yellow bars and
Sect. 3.6), and ATM and STM integration (see purple bars and
Sect. 3.7). The two entries coloured in green and blue are related
to Clean Space & the Environment or to Safety & Reliability,
respectively and are shown here for the sake of completeness.
S&R topics are addressed in Paper II (Tüllmann et al. 2017b).
Prior to establishing a STM system in Europe, three funda-
mental challenges need to be overcome (political or legislative
constraints are not covered in this study). These challenges are
related to the development and implementation of appropriate:
1) Infrastructure and technology (e.g., spaceports, spaceplanes,
data centres, FPS, Space Weather monitoring and SST sys-
tems, SWMC, ESSTraC and communication networks)
2) Operations concepts and procedures (e.g., for Space Weather
monitoring, SST, FPS, regulatory, S&R and ATM & STM in-
tegration, including ATCO & STCO handover/handback op-
erations and space traffic monitoring)
3) Products and Services (e.g., SWB, TEC maps, CRAs, trajec-
tories, flight plans and schedules, Space Traffic Navigation
Service Provider certifications and passenger services).
The areas of Space Weather, Space Debris & SST and ATM
& STM integration will most likely have to deal with all three
of the above mentioned aspects. The overarching task regard-
ing ATM and STM integration is the filling of STM-related gaps
identified in the SES initiative (see Figure 17) which requires to
have finished the entire Space Debris & SST and Space Weather
design and implementation subtask. Because the design, devel-
opment and implementation of the SWMC and ESSTraC share
several high-level commonalities (e.g., regarding comparable
complexities of system and operations concepts or the existence
of initial sensor networks and know-how), it is conceivable that
both centres could become operational by 2023. In parallel the
implementation of the FPS and the STM operations concepts is
ongoing (to be finished by mid-2026) and after the STM sys-
tem has been successfully validated, routine STM operations are
expected for March 2029.
The implementation of technological solutions for ESA’s
Clean Space and environmental initiatives (expected to be imple-
mented in parallel) will have an impact on the details of the STM
development roadmap and, therefore, both plans should be inte-
grated at a future date. The testing, validation and certification
of products and services, spaceports and spaceplanes is subject
to high uncertainties. However, given the estimated timeline for
spaceplane development in Europe (cf. Figure 20), Flight Readi-
ness Review could be in November 2030, which would constrain
the dates for routine spaceport operations and product and ser-
vice availability to the beginning of 2028 and mid of 2026, re-
spectively.
Table 5: Top 10 STM-related issues listed in priority order
 
Doc Id: 
Issue:  
Date: 
GfR-RPT-STM-0004 
1.0 
2016-12-16 
  
DLR GfR mbH  Page:155 of 176 
 
In Table 16 a detailed breakdown of the STM Roadmap is given. The original version of this 
table is a MS Project file (STM_Roadmap_v1.0_181116.mpp) and is also delivered as part of 
this report (DI-001). 
 Open issues 5.1
Based on the analyses performed in this study, the most important and pressing issues have 
been identified. Table 17 lists the Top 10 STM issues in priority order that have to be tackled for 
implementing a STM in Europe. This requires in some cases also pan-European coordination. 
Because STM is an international yet global understating, it is highly recommended that national 
solo attempts or individual initiatives initiated by single European nations with other 
stakeholders, such as the FAA or other non-European entities are avoided in order not to 
impede or slow down the consolidation process within the EU and between the EU and non-
European authorities. 
Priority Issue To be managed by 
1 Define and implement binding regulations, procedures and legislation to ensure safe STM operations in Europe EU/EC 
2 
UN to coordinate an international consensus on STM 
implementation (e.g., regarding safety requirements and 
standards for spaceplane operations in aerospace and 
STM operations) 
UN 
3 
Define European STM safety requirements including 
human factors, flight, occupant and on-ground safety 
(with international interfaces) 
EASA/Eurocontrol 
4 
Design and implementation of a European STM safety 
and operations concept that seamlessly integrates into 
the global context 
ESA 
5 
Design and implementation of a European Surveillance 
and Tracking Centre (e.g., including sensor networks, 
operations, products and services)
ESA 
6 
Design and implementation of a Space Weather 
Monitoring Centre  (e.g., including sensor networks, 
operations, products and services) 
ESA 
7 Design and implementation of a Flight Planning and Scheduling Facility (including international interfaces) ESA 
8 
Design and implementation of an aerospace handling 
concept for spaceplanes and SSVs (focusing on 
HOTOL, VTOL  and hybrid concepts)
EASA/FAA/Others 
9 
Design and development of needed Technologies and 
Infrastructure (e.g., for spaceports, spaceplanes, RPAS 
mitigation)
ESA 
10 
Design and implementation of Clean Space Concepts 
(e.g., related to noise reduction, environmental regula-
tions, fuel efficiency, or space debris removal) 
EU/EASA/ESA 
Table 17: Top 10 STM issues listed in priority order 
 
4. Open Issues
Based on the analyses performed in this paper, we identified the
most important and pressing issues regarding the implementa-
tion of a European STM system. In Table 5 the Top 10 STM-
related issues are listed in priority order that have to be tackled,
requiring a pan-European coordination approach.
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5. Future Work
Due to their complexity, the following topics are beyond the
scope of this study, but are highly recommended to be investi-
gated in dedicated follow-up programmes:
• Design and implementation concept for ESSTraC regarding
the following aspects:
– Identify hazards for SSV and spaceplane operations, in-
cluding requirements on heat and collision shielding and
dependencies on ATM and spaceport operations
– Detailed risk quantifications and trade-off studies for
space debris and re-entering objects
– Tracking concept for re-entering traceable and non-
traceable objects
– Operations Concept for ESSTraC
– Infrastructure and product design (e.g., sensor network,
near real-time trajectory calculations and dissemination,
communication and data links, plus supporting reliability
assessments)
• Design and implementation concept for the SWMC regard-
ing the following aspects:
– Detailed risk quantifications for space weather events
preventing routine suborbital p2p space flights
– Operations concept for the SWMC, supported by appro-
priate S&R assessments
– Infrastructure and product design (e.g., sensor network,
TEC maps, SWBs and dissemination schedule, commu-
nication and data links, plus supporting reliability assess-
ments)
• Analysis on how a European STM system can be smoothly
merged with the SES ATM concept, e.g., establish a com-
mon planning cycle for air and p2p space flight connections,
including:
– Short, mid, and long-term flight planning and scheduling
(including backups and contingency products)
– Contingency re-planning
– Handover and handback operations
– Realisation of Flight Corridor Handling without signif-
icantly affecting ATM operations and safety, including
supporting validation by S&R
• Establishment of a European work group, working on a con-
cept for the implementation of a global ATM/STM network,
including:
– Harmonisation of STM and ATM concepts (SES,
NextGen, etc.)
– Legal aspects (define binding regulations)
– Interface definition
– Roadmap generation and implementation monitoring
• Various areas applicable to S&R to enable a safe, reliable
and efficient development of the STM concept, including:
– Quantification and substantiation of the top level S&R re-
quirements for both the SSV occupants and third parties,
as well as decomposition into the different contributors
and the lower severity classes.
– S&R supporting validation and verification of technol-
ogy & systems to be implemented, including initiatives
designed to help, e.g. ESA’s Clean Space.
– The selection of an existing electronic tool or, the de-
velopment of a dedicated one, to facilitate the reporting,
collection and storage of in-service occurrences.
– Development of a detailed certification processes for
SNSPs, spaceports and other actors in the STM industry.
6. Summary
Together with its partner institutes and companies, DLR GfR
has conducted on behalf of ESA an evaluation study with the
objective to generate a roadmap for the implementation of a Eu-
ropean Space Traffic Management system under consideration
of the evolving Air Traffic Management system. In this context,
one of the most important commercial drivers for Space Traffic
is considered Space Travel, focussing on manned ballistic sub-
orbital flights for space adventurers and suborbital point-to-point
passenger (and cargo) transportation. Therefore, the term "Space
Traffic Management" is defined in the context of this study as
the: "Execution of all necessary Managing and M&C operations
to ensure safe ballistic travel of manned and unmanned space-
planes through suborbital space and airspace under consider-
ation of the existing European Air Traffic Management System
and Infrastructure".
The most important findings and recommendations of this
work can be summarised as follows:
1) In order to evaluate whether the risk of a spaceplane colli-
ding during its suborbital flight with a piece of space debris
(or other space objects) do not actually rule out suborbital
p2p flights from the very beginning, we considered a hypo-
thetical flight from Sydney (Australia) to Oberpfaffenhofen
(Germany) and calculated the minimum miss distance from
the space vehicle’s adopted ballistic trajectory to all trace-
able objects in the NORAD TLE catalogue. Based on certain
assumptions (cf. Sect. 3.4.1), we provided proof of concept
that p2p travel through suborbital and LEO space is gener-
ally feasible as there seem to be sufficiently long time slots
between the two closest encounters which would ensure safe
passage of the vessel. However, dedicated follow-up stud-
ies are needed, focussing on launch window optimisations
(e.g., by considering more realistic trajectories for HOTOLs,
VTOLs and hybrid spaceplanes and time periods longer than
12 hours), different flight destinations and smaller traceable
object sizes.
2) We identified a clear gap between current spacecraft shield-
ing capabilities of about 1 mm and the minimum traceable
object size of about 3 cm in future catalogues of traceable
objects. The statistical risk for a catastrophic event posed by
this gap was determined to be of the order of 1 × 10−3 per
flight, assuming an SSV with a cross section of 100 m2 and
that the risk of colliding with an object is 1 out of 100 poten-
tially catastrophic scenarios. This risk appears already rela-
tively high for the small-sized SSVs that shall be deployed
for vertical ballistic flights, but would even increase beyond
an acceptable level of ∼8 × 10−3 per flight, if cross sections
for Skylon-like spaceplanes of about 700 m−2 are considered.
Therefore, this gap could turn out to be a real show stopper,
provided it cannot be reduced by applying new heat and col-
lision shielding technologies which withstand impacts from
objects larger than 1 mm. Here it is most important to close
the gap in the lower size range, as the smallest objects pose
the highest risk.
3) Regarding STM, Europe is not well prepared to serve the
developing Space Travel market in the near future, be-
cause fundamental operations concepts, products and ser-
vices and infrastructure needed for safe spaceplane opera-
tions in aerospace is missing.
4) Therefore, a reference operations scenario (ROS) was de-
fined, reflecting typical day-to-day operations for suborbital
space flights, against which the European STM concept
should be developed (Figure 1). We recommend that future
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technical and conceptual work focusses primarily on the im-
plementation of ESSTraC and the SWMC (and their respec-
tive monitoring networks), the FPSF, ATM & STM integra-
tion (e.g., regarding flight corridor handling) and the identi-
fied products and services (e.g., SWBs, TEC maps, CRAs,
on-demand trajectory computations, FPS services).
5) Finally, the initial roadmap for implementing a European
STM system has been presented (see Figure 21 for a simpli-
fied version) together with the Top 10 STM issues that need
to be tackled on a European and UN level (see Table 5).
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